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SMUART S. BALL
I
The following propositions have been elsewhere advancdd:
(1) The real "land" in law is three-dimensional space,
containing solid matter treated as realty because of more or less
permanent occupancy of a defined space.1
(2) The right of ownership is the right to the ultimate
possession of the thing owned.2
(3) The courts in most common law jurisdictions have
recognized rights of ownership in the space both superjacent and
subjacent to the surface of the soil.
Assuming for the moment the truth of these propositions, the
problem to which a solution is now sought may be formulated:
Can the superjacent landspace be divided by horizontal planes
into strata capable of several ownership? 4 Since land has no
natural boundaries, but is always separated by artificial and
arbitrary means, it would be no more arbitraxy to divide it in
this way than to divide it, as we now do, by vertical planes, once
we assume or conclude that space is the real "land." Have we
any precedents? It is purposed to demonstrate that we have.
The test to be applied to the cases must take into account the
following considerations: A man may have the right to use the
space of another without depriving that other of ownership; he
may own a material thing occupying space owned by another;
and he may be given the present possession of a portion of an-
other's space without being given the ownership of it. We must
reject cases which illustrate these situations but which do not
* Considerable labor in seeking and checking authorities, as well as in
preparing the body of the article, was contributed by the writer's brother,
Mr. Ralph K. Ball, of Evansion, Illinois.
Ball, The Jural Nature of Land (1928) 23 ILL. L. Roav. 45.
- Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L
REaV. 631, 644 et seq.
3 Ibid.
The following xemarks, written in 1862, show that the problem had
occurred to members of the profession that early:
"First, as to this space or column of air over a man's land... . We
know of no case in which an effort has been made by grant or conveyance
to sever it from the soil and give an exclusive right in it, in the manner
in which, as we shall presently show, the herbage or mineral strata may be
severed from the body of the ground." E. S. M., Horizontal Divisions of
Land (1862) 1 AitL L. Ra. (N. S.) 577, 578.
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hold that ownership o a portion limited horizontally as well as
vertically has been carved out of the original lot.
When a room or an apartment is leased, is it the cubic space
of the room which is demised or only the floors, walls, and ceil-
ings? 5 If the latter, the lease would include by implication the
grant only of a right in the nature of an easement to use the
space so inclosed. The lease of rooms has been held to give the
right of exclusive possession to the lessee." It seems reasonable
to assume that the right should extend to the inclosed space, but
unfortunately no practical test is afforded by the cases. Our
present interest in this proposition lies in an inference which
could be drawn from proof of the affirmative. Since ownership
5 There can be a leasing of a floor, or of a suite of rooms, or of single
rooms, creating a true tenancy with all of its incidents, including the right
to bring trespass. In White v. Maynard, 111 Mass. 250, 254 (1872),
Mr. Justice Gray said:
"An entire floor, or a series of rooms, or even a single room may doubt-
less be let for lodgings, so separated from the house as to become in fact
and in law the separate tenement of the lessee."
To the same effect are: Swain v. Mizner, 8 Gray 182 (Mass. 1857);
Lane v. Dixon, 3 C. B. 776 (1847); Stamper v. Sunderland-near-the-sea,
L. R. 3 C. P. 388 (1868).
This rule would apply to our modern apartments: Davis v. Hartel, 56
Pa. Super. 557 (1914); McDowell v. Hyman, 117 Cal. 67, 48 Pac. 984
(1897). In the last cited case, the court remarked:
"Flats are as much separate dwellings as ordinary adjoining houses are.
The difference is that flats are under one roof, and are divided one from
another by a horizontal plane, but ordinary adjoining houses by a per-
.pendicular or vertical plane." Ibid. 71, 48 Pac. at 986.
6 A lease of rooms, creating the relation of landlord and tenant, must be
carefully distinguished from agreements creating only the relation of lodger
and lodging house keeper. Very frequently one -who occupies a room or a
suite of rooms is not a tenant but a lodger. The distinction is important
to remember at this point of our discussion, gince, as was said in Mathews
v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 267, 85 At. 529, 531 (1912): "The tenant has
the exclusive possession of hii rooms, while the lodger has merely the ue
without the actual or exclusive possession which Temain in the lessor."
Accord: Messerly v. Mercer, 45 Mo. App. 327 (1891); Fludier v. Lombe,
Lee & H. 307 (1736); Brewer v. McGowan, L. R. 5 C. P. 239 (1869);
Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 At. 68 (1909). As a consequence,
the lodger can bring neither ejectment nor trespass. Allen v. Overseers
of Liverpool, L. R. 9 Q. B. 180 (1874); Wilson v. Martin, 1 Denio 602
(N. Y. 1845); Mathews v. Livingston, supra; White v. Maynard, supra
note 5.
In denying trespass to a lodger, in Lane v. Dixon, supra note 5, Mr. Jus-
tice Maule speaks of the lodger's right as a "mere easement of sleeping
in one room, and eating and drinking in another." Ibid, 784. For the
basis of the distinction, cf. Fox v. Windemere Hotel Apartment Co., 30
Cal. App. 162, 157 Pap. 826 (1916) ; Commonwealth v. Lynchburg Y. LT.
C. A., 115 Va. 745, 80 S. E. 589 (1914); Dewar v. Minneapolis Lodge,
155 Minn. 98, 192 N. W. 358 (1923). See also Note AuN. CAS. 1914A 200,
in which reference is made to a considerable list of English cases; and
TIFFANy, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1st ed. 1910) § 8.
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is no more nor less than the fight to the ultimate possession, it
follows that, if we can conceive of the stratification of cubic
space for purposes of possession, we can conceive of it so divided
for purposes of ownership. There is, however, considerable
reason for believing that leases of rooms are not in reality
treated by the, courts as a grant for a term of the possession
of the space enclosed.7 If so, we must find support for our
general proposition elsewhere.,
7 In the case of a demise of rooms for years, it is generally recognized
that the destruction of the building terminates the lease. McMillan v.
Soloman, 42 Ala. 356 (1868); Ainsworth v..Ritt, 88 Cal. 89 (1869).; Stock-
well v. Hunter, 11 Metc. 448 (Mass. 1846); Kerr v. Merchant's Exchange
Co., 3 Edw. Ch. 315 (N. Y. 1839); Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 498 (1883);
Rowan v. Kelsey, 2 Keyes 597 (N. Y. 1866); Winton: v. Cornish, 5 Ohio
477 (1832); Hilliard v. Gas Coal Co., 41 Ohio St. 662 (1885).
The reasoning of these cases is typified by this remark from the McMillan
case, supra at 364: "Where there is a lease of- the mere apartments of a
house, and those apartments are destroyed, the thing rented is gone."
It has been held that when a demise of rooms is made, the walls are
included in the demise. Hope Bros., Ltd. v. Cowan, [1913J 2 Ch. 312;
Goldfoot v. Welch, [1914J 1 Ch. 213.
In Leiferman v. Osten, 167 Ill. 93, 47 N. E. 203 (1897), the lessee of
rooms remained in possession even though the building containing them
was moved to a different part of the lot. Clearly he had lost his occupancy
of the space enclosed by the room when originally leased; but the court
held that the moving of the building did not constitute an ouster, saying:
"It does not appear that he was deprived of anything that could reasonably
be held to pertain to his lease of the 'first flat' of No. 1255 Wolfram St.)
Ibid. 100, 47 N. E. at 205.
8 We cannot find such support in the rule that buildings, although ordi-
narily in law a part of the land on which they are erected, may, by an
express agreement to the contrary or by the implications of an agreement
giving the 'right to removal at the expiration of the license to use the land
built upon, be separately owned; for they then become personal property.
It is obvious that we are dealing with the difference between fixtures and
affixtures, and that our only concern is with the title to the chattels which
have entered into the building of the house. The cases are too numerous
to be cited here. See, generally, 21 RULING CASE LAw 59, § 33 et seq. An
excellent summary is to be found in Note (1909) 12 ANN. CAS. 1088.
1 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1st ed. 1924) § 61 misstates their effect.
Before the Reception, the Germanic law permitted, buildings to be Sep-
arately owned, but they were then treated as movables and not as im-
movables. HUNEan, HISTORY OF GEnuMANic PRIVATE LAW (Cont. Leg. Hist.
Series, 1918) 172-3. Habner suggests that this rule arose in a day when
buildings were far. less permanent, and their builders more nomadic. The
cold Germanic notion took root for a while in Italy in the height of the
Germanic influence on Italian politics; but the Roman conception of the
unity of the principal thing and its accessories gradually overcame it.
The mediaeval communes, in effectuating the return to the Roman law rule,
even enacted legislation providing for purchases and sales necessary to
reintegrate ownership of all parts of the thing. CALIssm, HISTORY OF
ITALLAN LAw (Cont. Leg. Hist. Series, 1928) § 415, p. 671.
The fact that courts, as in Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Board, 84 Iowa 407,
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The cases involving freeholds in chambers or apartments must
be considered. When a room or suite of rooms is deeded
separately from the soil beneath, either one of two results is
conceivable:
(1) A right of ownership is created which relates to the ma-
terial definition of the room-the walls, floor, and ceiling-and
is coupled with either an easement or possessory right relating
to the space inclosed.
(2) A right of ownership is created relating to the space in-
closed as well as to the inclosing matter.
If the latter. alternative be adopted as the solution, a practical
question arises in the event of the destruction of the building in
which the rooms are located. If the rule be that ownership
ceases, it is still possible to say that the space was owned in fee,
but it follows that the fee was defeasible by a condition subse-
quent. The emphasis is placed, not on the space, but on that
which bounds the space. The walls are what is important. If
destruction defeats the fee, it is less cohiplicated to hold that an
easement or possessory right in the space, not ownership, fol-
lows ownership of the walls, and that the owner of the lot re-
tains the fee to his solid land column.
If the space be truly owned, logic does not demand that owner-
ship be affected by the destruction of the building. Space, be-
ing conceptual, is not affected by the history of matter existing
in it. Ownership, as a right relating to a thing, need not be
affected by the destruction of the inclosing walls, since the thing
-which is the point of reference, the bit of space, remains intact.
It should be frankly recognized that, in the case of a grant of
an upper room, we are dealing with an exception to the normal
operation bf legal rules, even though the common law jurisdic-
tions have never applied the maxim superficies eolo'cedit as in-
exorably as have those jurisdictions with a purely Roman tradi-
tion. Probably there was a time when the English courts would
not have upheld the conveyance of an upper chamber. The
51 N. W. 18 (1892), sometimes hold such buildings taxable as 'realty" does
mot bear on our question.
9 We find in Booxm's AIMGMEMNT (1586) tit. 'Demaunde," pl. 20, foL
213, reference to a case in the year books, 5 HEu. VII, 9, -where, in answer
to a suggestion that a man might have a frankteenement; in an upper cham-
ber, it -was said that such could not be, for it could not continue, since, if
the foundation failed, the chamber would be gone.
A note by Sweet, editor of the third edition, in CHALLiS, LAW OP BuAL
:Pnorm2y (1911) 48 et seq., refers to this. Sweet regards the rule permit-
ting chamber ownership as a "heresy" which has found its way into the
common law, because he believes that it is inconsistent with and an excep-
tion to the rule that corporeal hereditaments are indestructible. This is a
19301
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change in attitude which has occurred, curiously enough, reflects
a custom prevalent among the members of the legal profession
sharing the privileges and fellowship of the Inns of Court.
Originally, the chambers in the Inner and Middle Temples were
in effect leased to those to whom they were assigned. The early
admittances noted in the records appear to have been made upon
this basis. A considerable amount of building construction was
made during the reign of Elizabeth, for the growth of the
Temple societies made .necessary more chambers. The societies
were not able to finance such expansion, and the difficulty was
solved in the fashion indicated by the following entry in the
minutes of the parliament of the Middle Temple:
"The chambers which Mr. William Herbert, one of the fellows,
will build on the site of the old kitchen, shall be granted to him
alone for life, and no one else shall be admitted thereto by the
Treasurer during his life. . .. He may assign or leave by will
these chambers to any fellow or fellows, .who shall hold them
similarly." 10 0
Many similar entries are to be found in the Temple records of
the period, and the practice soon became so prevalent in the
Middle Temple that it practically superseded the former
leasings.11
clear acknowledgment that he considers the thing owned as the portion of
the material building conveyed. He emphasizes this view by the following
sentence:
"It seems clear on principle that, if the house is burnt down or otherwise
destroyed, the rights of the owner of the upper chamber cease, but the
point does not appear to have been decided." Ibid. 54.
101 MIDDLE TEMPLE RECORDS (Hopwood's ed. 1904) 207: minutes of a
parliament of the Temple of Nov. 17, 1575 (17 Eliz.).
2 A number are cited and discussed in WLLIAmsoN, THE HIsToRY OF THE
TEMPLE, LONDON (1924) 227, 228, 234, 235, 236, 291, and 292. William-
son says, concerning this activity:
"Probably the Society had little money to spend on such enterprises, for
new chambers at this time were generally erected by individual members
at their own expense, the Benchers in return acknowledging a certain pro-
prietary interest in the member who had incurred the outlay. Later it
became the regular practice to give the builder a life interest, with the
right to make one or more assignments to take effect thereafter." Ibid. 227.
These remarks were prompted by entries around 1578. In 1577 there is
an entry indicating that all Masters of the Bench in the Middle Temple
were to have their bedchambers for life. In the first decades of the 17th
century attempts were made to stop this private building so that the
Temple could have the sole letting of the rooms.
One odd circumstance is that the societies did not have a fee interest in
the inns at this time, for they were then paying a nominal yearly charge
to the Crown, and did not until later (1608) completely acquire the prop-
erties.
Dugdale, describing the manner of life in the Middle 'Temple, spoke of
the "ancient usage and custume of the house" by which one admitted to a
EVol. 30
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The justices, intiated in the custom by the circumstances of
their apprenticeship in the profession, could no longer regard
the idea of a freehold in an upper chamber as a strange and
impossible one. In 1638, two men were arraigned for breaking
and entering a barrister's chambers. The reporter says:
"And first, it was resolved that a chamber of any inns of court
or chancery broken open may be said to be domus mwniondis.
of him who is owner of the said chamber." 2
By this time the custom must have bred counterparts among
the laity of growing London. We are not surprised, therefore,
to find Lord Coke telling us:
"A man may have an inheritance in an upper chamber, though
the lower buildings and soile be in another, and seeing it is an
inheritance corporeall it shall passe by livery." 23
Shortly after Coke wrote, ejectment was allowed in Ford v.
Lerke14 for a house, a barn, and a kitchen. The part most
doubted was the kitchen, but the court pointed out that, since it
had been held that there could be a frank-tenement in an upper
room, so there could be ejectment for a kitchen."
chamber had it for life -with power to sell it to another member to hold
upon the same conditions. DUGDALE, ORIGINES URIDICAIxS (printed in 1790
as "Historical Memorials of the English Laws") 88. It is not clear whether
Dugdale intends to imply that only benchers so hold a life interest. He
tells us that "all but the benchers go two in a chamber; a bencher only
hath the privilege of a chamber to himself." The next sentence may refer
either to all in chambers, or only to those benchers who are admitted to
one for themselves alone.
Dugdale has it that the interest could be forfeited: "... -for unless he be
in commons six weeks in each year, he forfeits his chamber to the house."
This is in direct contradiction to the grant to Mr. William Herbert, part of
which is quoted in the text, and to many of the other similar entries. It
may be that Dugdale has failed to distinguish the old chambers, presumably
still let by the house, from the new ones built in accordance with the pro-
prietary grants; or possibly the system he described resulted from the
abolition of the differences in the two tenures by the passing of years.
'22Evans & Finch's Case, Cro. Car. 473 (1638). This case has been cited
many times by the English courts in support of the separate rating of the
various "houses" in tenements, although the separate holdings there in-
volved are generally let premises.
23 Co. LDTT. *42b. So, too, we are told in the Touchst n that: "A feoff-
ment may be made of an upper chamber over another man's house beneath."
SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE (1651) 206;. of. similar language in 1 PR.ETON,
ESTATES (1828) 8. The passage from the Touchstono is quoted with ap-
proval in Mott v. Palmer, 1 W. Y. 564 (1848).
N14 oy 109 (1604).
I 5Accord,. as to right to bring ejectment for a room: Brady v Xreuger,
8 S. D. 464, 66 N. W. 1083 (1896) ; White v. White, 16 X. S. L. 202 (1837).




In 1787, Mr. Justice Ashurst remarked:
"We know that in London different persons have several free-
holds over the same spot; different parts of the same house are
let out to, different people. That is the case in the Inns of
Court." "I
Here the recognition of the rule was coupled with a reference
to its origini. In that case, the rule was invoked to show that
a conveyance~of a shop did not include the cellar beneath, which
had been separately demised previous to the conveyance. The
case is the leading one in England in support of the rule that
a room can be separately owned.
We find numerous cases in this country to the same effect. In
holding that the upper stories of a brick opera house, which
were conveyed by deed by the owner of the soil and lower
stories, constituted real estate so as to give the grantee all the
rights of an owner of land, the Illinois Supreme CourV said:
I
"A house, or even the upper chamber of a house, may be held
separately from the soil on which it stands, and an action of
ejectment will lie to recover it." 27
In its reasoning, the court attached great weight to the fact
that there was no way of removing the upper stories, and seemed
to be aided in, reaching the decision by that fact. The inference
is that the thing conveyed was the part of the physical structure
and not the landspace.
In an Iowa case,18 the homestead exemption statute was made
to work a separation of a first floor and cellars from the second
and third stories and the soil. The first floor was occupied by
shops, and the cellars were used in connection with the shops.
The defendant in execution occupied the second and third stories
for his home. It was held that the second and third- stories and
the soil were exempt as a homestead, but that the first floor and
l0 Freeland v. Burt, 1 T. R. 701; 11787). The word "let" here refers to
more than a leasing, since the court in the next sentence discussed a lease
to a third party of the chambers which had been purchased.
27 Madison v. Madison, 206 Ill. 534, 537, 69 N. E. 625, 627 (1903).
In Piper v. Taylor, 48 N. D. 967, 970, 188 N. W. 171, 172 (1922), an
association paid the consideration for the erection of a second story, took
possession on completion, paid the taxes, and kept up the insurance in its
own name. The court said:
"The owner of the land intended that the association should own the
second story. He would have deeded the same to the association except for
the advice received that! such could not legally be done. This advice was
erroneous. Caldwell could have granted or reserved the second story alone,
as the parties desired. Real estate may be granted or leased divided upon
perpendicular or lateral lines.
28 Rhodes, Pegram & Co. v. McCormick, 4 Iowa 368 (1857).
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cellars, not being within the exemption because of the use to
which they were put, were liable to be -sold on execution. In
enumerating the rights of the purchaser on execution, the court
said:
"The purchaser under the execution acquires the right to the
possession of the first floor and cellar and every part of each;
whic, -right is to continue as long w, the same is tenantable."'
(Italics ours)
3Ibid. 375-376. A similar result of the operation of the Iowa homestead
law was sustained by the state supreme court in two later cases: Mayfield
v. Maasden, 59 Iowa 517, 13 N. W. 652 (1882); Johnson v. Moser, 66 Iowa
536, 24 N. W. 32 (1885). In other cases the Iowa court has reached a
different result, not ostensibly because of a changed interpretation of the
homestead law, but because the evidence did not show a sufficiently definite
separation in use of the living quarters from the other parts of the build-
ing. Wright v. Ditzler, 54 Iowa 620, 7 N. W. 98 (1880) ; Smith v. Quiggans,
65 Iowa 637, 22 N. W. 907 (1885); Cass County Bank v. Weber, 83 Iowa
63, 48 N. W. 1067 (1891); Buckles v. Matson, 178 Iowa 310, 169 N. W.
1007 (1916). In the last cited case, Mr. Justice Gaynor spoke of the rule
of the Rhodes case as "of very doubtful propriety."
The courts of several other states have refused to follow the Rhodes case
in interpreting their homestead laws. Phelps v. Rooney, 9 Wi& 70 (1859).;
12 Wis. 698 (1860) (on rehearing); Norris v. Kidd, 28 Arik 485 (1873);
Smith v. Guckenhehmer, 42 Fla. 1, 27 So. 900 (1900). In the first case, Mr.
Chief Justice Dixon vigorously dissented on the rehearing, arguing that the
common law rule permitting the division of ownership led logically to the
conclusion reached by the Iowa court. A federal court, construing the
Iowa homestead law in a bankruptcy case, criticized the Rhodes case and
refused to follow it, attempting as well to distinguish its facts. In re Coles,
224 Fed. 170 (N. D. Iowa 1915). It should be observed that the quarrel
other courts have sometimes had with the Rhodes case is because they
believed the result inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the home-
stead exemption statutes and not because they did not believe that the law
can recognize divided ownership of a building.
The Illinois Supreme Court has approved the Rhodes case in Potter v.
Clapp, 203 Ill. 592, 68 N. E. 81 (1903). The opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Hand is interesting because it shows that the growth of large apartment
buildings does influence the court to recognize such stratifications:
'While in a case like this it might work no great harm to hold the widow
after the death of the householder might rightfully retain the possession of
the entire building until her homestead was assigned, if the principle were
applied to a building containing, as is often the case in large cities, many
flats or apartments, it would lead to absurd results." Ibi. 605, 68 N. E.
at 85.
The same premises as in the Rhodes case were involved in McCormick v.
Bishop, 28 Iowa 233 (1869), and it was held that the purchaser under the
execution sale of the first floor and cellars -was not a tenant in common
with the owner of the exempb homestead; but that the two owners were
adjoining tenants, with several and divided interests. In the case of a
similar separation, differently effected, the Illinois court also denied that
any joint estate existed. McConnel v. Kibbe, 43 Ill. 12 (1867).
The complete separation in law of the two freeholds -which can thus be
created was further emphasized in Badger Lumber Co. v. Stepp, 157 Mo.
366, 57 S. W. 1058 (1900), where a third story was separately owned from
19301
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The limitation indicates that rights of ownership would be
defeated by the destruction of the building. Indeed, this seems
to be the tendency of many of the cases. In them we can find
little or no comfort for a belief that space above the soil is sus-
ceptible of ownership in horizontal strata20 In other cases, the
implications are somewhat more favorable.
the lot and remainder of the building, and a contractor's lien was said
to be valid against only the part on which work was actually done.20 Thus, in Thorn v. Wilson, 110 Ind. 325, 11 N. E. 230 (1886), the first
party was to erect a one story building, and granted and allowed the
second parties "to build and complete a story . . . on top of the above
mentioned first story of said building.., to have and to own said second
story of the said building for the use of the parties of the second part
perpetually." The court treated this as a grant merely of an easement, a
"right to perpetually use the second story," so that "when the use termi-
nated, all their interest in the building was gone so that they could convey
none by deed."
The view that a grant is terminated by the physical destruction of the
premises is adopted in 1 THoMrPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1st ed. 1924) 60; of.
also the remarks to be found in Sweet's note to CHALLIs, REAL PROPERTY,
supra, note 9.
The separate ownership of upper chambers has been recognized in a
number of cases where the issues had to do with the mutual rights of
support and repairs as between the upper and lower freeholders. It has
always been recognized that the owner of an upper chamber has such
a right to support from the walls below that any act of the lower owner
endangering the stability of the upper tenement is an actionable wrong.
Anonymous, Keilw. 98, pl. 4 (1508) ; Bush v. Field, Cary 90 (1580) ; Anony-
mous, 11 Mod. 7 (1702); Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575 (1808); Cheese-
borough v. Green, 10 Conn. 318 (1834); Ottumwa Lodge v. Lewis, 34
Iowa 67 (1871); Jackson v. Bruns, 129 Iowa 616, 106 N. W. 1 (1906);
McConnel v. Kibbe, 33 Ill. 175 (1864). In the last case cited, which in-
volved the same premises as McConnel v. Kibbe, supra note 19, it was held
that the removal of support was in itself such an infringement of the upper
proprietor's right as to obviate the necessity of showing special damage.
The anonymous case in Keilwey, supra, also suggests that, if I am a
lower proprietor, I may compel the upper do cover son hauto rcason. on
salvation del timber de ma measom; and vice versa, if I am an upper owner,
my right to support may be broad enough to entitle me to demand that the
lower owner repair his timbers. If the law be that way, the proper remedy,
said the judges, was an action on the case. In the later anonymous case
in 11 Modern, supra, Holt, C.J., is reported to have said that "every man,
of common right, ought to so support his own house as that it may not be
an annoyance to another man's.'"
In this country it seems to be generally agreed that no right to demand
repairs to the roof or supporting walls exists. Cheeseborough v. Green;
Jackson v. Bruns, both supra; Weaver v. Osborne, 154 Iowa 10, 134 N. W.
103 (1912); Pierce v. Dyer, 109 Blass. 374 (1872). See 1 TIFANY, REAL
PaOPERTY (1st ed. 1920) § 355; 1 C. J. 1232. Conversely, it has been held
that if the owner of the upper story repairs his roof, or the owner of the
lower story his walls or foundation, he cannot require contribution from
his subjacent or superjacent neighbor, although the latter benefitted.
Loring v. Bacon; Ottumwa L6dge-v. Lewis, both supra. Without such rights,
the upper owner's tenure must be defeated by the destruction of the building.
[Vol. 39
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In Hahn v. Baker Lodge 21 there was a grant of a certain speci-
fied room in a building, without any stipulations as to rebuilding
in case of fire or other casualty. The building burned. The
court said:
.... the defendant did not acquire any right of ownership in
the building or any part of it, but in the room. or space inclosed
by that part of the building which was described and identified as
the middle room or hall of the upper story. This it owned ...
But when the fire destroyed the building....., there was noth-
ing remaining upon which the defendant's conveyance could
operate and its rights at once teminated." 2'
Here the court distinguished the space occupied bk the room
from the structure which was the room, and held that the right
of ownership had as its point of reference the space inclosed by
the walls, and not the walls themselves. Nevertheless, it fol-
lowed the rule, which it quoted from other cases,2 that the
destruction of the physical premises was also a destruction of
the fee. This -was upon the theory, not that the estate -was in
the structure which was destroyed, but that it was defeasible
when the space could no longer be identified by the same physical
bounds which first defined it. The result practically may be
commendable, but it is not logically necessary. Be that as it
may, we have in the language of the court a judicial recognition
of the possibility of vertical division. As long as thb structure
remained, the defendant owned a bit of space called a room
which is not to be confused with the physical structure surround-
ing it. His ownership was of fee dignity, although subject to
untimely dissolution. For the time being he was the owner of
a portion of cubic space, shaped like a child's block, intangible
and impermanent as a mirage.
The Canadian Supreme Court had considerable difficulty when
confronted with deciding just what was acquired by the adverse
possession of a second story room, a shop partly below the room,
and the land which went with the store.24 The adverse posses-
sion had continued for more than the limitations period, twelve
years, but for a shorter time than the prescriptive period,
twenty years, necessary for the acquisition of an easement. The
problem was not fully solved when the majority of the court
decided that the adverse possession of the upper room gave a
title, although two justices doubted even that conclusion.2
2121 Ore. 30, 27 Pac. 166 (1891).
22 Ibid. 33, 27 Pac. at 167.
23 From Thorn v. Wilson, supra note 20.
-Iredale v. Loudon, 40 Can. Sup. Ct. 313 (1908).
25In the Court of Appeal (the intermediate court) Garrow, J.A., be-
lieved that the statute of limitations referring to adverse possession did
19301
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The upper room was only partly supported by the shop below,
which had also been occupied by the adverse possessor. Should
the owner, who of course retained his title to the rest of the
building, decide to tear it down, the upper room would dangle
precariously and in all probability suffer eventual destruction.
Mr. Justice Duff, with the concurrence of Chief Justice Fitz-
patrick, argued that a possessory title gave none of the incidents
6f a title obtained by grant, and hence that the adverse posses-
sor in the instant case could demand no support from him whom
he had disseized. Such a right of support might be acquired
as a positive easement after occupancy for the prescriptive, as
opposed to .the limitations, period.
Mr. Justice Davies would not subscribe to this diminution of
the adverse possessor's rights. He considered that the title
acquired was of the space and not of the structure, saying:
"I did not understand it to be contended that a valid grant
could not be made of an upper room or flat in a building which
would give the grantee such a right as amounted to ownership
of the space within the room or flat or part of the building
granted, with, as against the grantor, a right of support and a
necessary right of passage to the premises." .
He believed that it logically followed that the right of support
was a "proprietary right passing with the premises acquired
by possession, essential to its existence and inseparable from
it." 2 In using the phrase, "essential to its existence," he ira-
not apply, since any right acquired would "of necessity" be impermanent,
and the statute comprehended only permanent properties. His argument
as to the impermanency of the room was predicated upon the certainty he
felt that the right of support was such a positive easement as would have
to be acquired by virtue of a claim enduring for the prescriptive rather
than the limitations period. Maclaren, J.A., felt the same way about
the easement of support. Moss, C.J.0., concurred in holding the statute
of limitations inapplicable, arguing: ". . . a naked grant of an estate in
freehold in an upper room does not carry with it an interest in the subjacent
soil so as to make the grant savour of the permanence of realty." He was
also of the opinion that the acts of the claimant were not sufficient to meet
the requirements of adverse possession. 15 Ont. L. R. 286 (1907).
se Iredale v. Loudon, supra note 24, at 317.,
27 The learned justice here suggests a problem which may be analyzed
as follows: With ownership are normally associated a number of other
rights, such as the right to immediate possession, and the right to lateral
support. Ownership as a right is thus usually but a part of a complex
or bundle. The owner-the dominus of the claim to the ultimate posses-
sion-may divest himself one by one of many-of these incidental Tights.
For example, he can give a lease for years, and thus create in another
the right to immediate possession. Mr. Justice Davies suggests that there
are certain minima beyond which this process cannot go, and that the right
to vertical support must necessarily accompany the right of ownership
to an upper chamber. It is an indivisible complex with which we then
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plied that the right of ownership, although of the space and not
of the structure alone, was defeasible by the destruction of the
building, as was held in the Halm case.28
We come now to a group of cases which axe most easily ex-
plained by assuming a stratification of the landspace.
In Corbett v. Hil f 2 two contiguous properties in London had
been deeded separately by the man who then owned both of them.
To the defendant he conveyed number thirty-four Eastcheap "as
the same were then in the occupation of Joseph Prince." To
the plaintiff he conveyed number fifteen Philpot Lane. Plans
of the ground floor were drawn in the margin of both convey-
ances. In 1866, the defendant started to pull down his building
and discovered that a room on the first floor (first above the
ground floor) of number fifteen Philpot Lane projected into
and was supported by, his house. No projections were shown
by the ground floor plans in the margins of the deeds.
The defendant, on rebuilding, manifested an intention of
building over the roof of the projecting room. The plaintiff then
sought an injunction on the basis of a continuing trespass, claim-
ing the column of airspace above the projection. The defendant
contended that the grant, by referring to the plat of the ground
floor, impliedly gave him all above and all below the surface o'
the ground floor area conveyed him. He invoked the maxim,
cujus est soZum, ejus esb msqzue ad coelura.. If his contention
had been wholly sustained, the plaintiff could have claimed no
deal. It might be suggested, as an answer to any such belief, that in
mining law it has been held that the owner of the surface may divest
himself entirely of the right to vertical support as against the owner of
a subjacent mineral stratum, so that the surface may be let down to an
extent that results in complete destruction of its economic value. Row-
botham v. Wilson, 8 H. L. C. 348 (1860); Duke of Bucleuch v. Wakefeld,
L. R. 4 H. L. 377 (1870)1; Penman v. Jones, 256 Pa 416, 100 AtI. 104S
(1917). But of. Hilton v. Granville, L. Rt 5 Q. B. 701 (1845).
In the trial court Mr. Justice Blabee had granted an injunction against
the one seeking to tear away the support. His argument -was this: "I
think any act of the defendants that interferes with the right of posses-
sion and enjoyment by the plaintiff of the premises now occupied by him.
would be a trespass." His 'opinion may be found in 14 Ont. L. R. 17, 21
(1906).
An unnamed author criticized this case in a Canadian legal periodical
under the caption Castles in the Air. (1908) 44 CAN. L. . 593, 597. (The
phrase had been used by Maclaren, T.AL, in the court of appeal.) The
critic said: "The only reasonable inference appears to be, not that ali
upper chamber is per se land, but that its connection with the Eoil makes
it in contemplation of law a part of that particular piece of land over
which it is erected." To one;. believing that, it -would be impossible, of
course, to consider space as ever susceptible of ownership in, horizontal
strata.
2 Supra note 21.
21 L. R. 9 Eq. 671 (1870).
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rights because of the projection of his room, and probably he
could not even have maintained that projection. The Vice-
Chancellor, however, argued that the'maxim states only a re-
buttable presumption, and that, if the intent is clear, titles may
be created which carry no such implications.3O Admitting that
ownership by the plaintiff of the projecting room was not pre-
cluded by any rule of law, the Vice-Chancellor proceeded:
"The question then arises, whether the protrusion is a dimin-
ution of so much of the freehold, including the right upwards
and downwards, as is defined horizontally by a section of the
protrusion; or whether such a portion only is carved out of the
freehold as is included between the ceiling of the room at the top
and the floor at the bottom.
"In my opinion the protruding room here effects only a dim-
inution of the last-mentioned limited character. The diminution
does not extend beyond the protrusion itself, which the plaintiff
has, of course, retained as part of his freehold." 31
This is his final conclusion as to the rights of the parties:
cc... subject to the exception which has been obtained or made
by reason of the protrusion, the owner of the house in Eastcheap
still remains the owner of everything else, including the column
30 That the maxim when applied at common law states only a rebuttable
presumption has been frequently pointed out. Hazeltine says:
"We may, if we wish, l6ok upon: this maxim as amounting, after all,
to a presumption that the landowner's right is of such indefinite scope;
this presumption admitting of rebuttal on proof that some other man owns
a stratum below the surface or above the surface. This view, therefore,
really comes only to this, that the landowner's right includes in all cases
the entire subsoil and the entire air-space unless he has sold or leased
a stratum of soil or air-space to somebody else." HAZELTINE, LAW OF TUE
Am (1911) 75.
In discussing this phasd of the Corbett case, counsel referred to such
earlier decisions as Freeland v. Burt, umpra note 16, where a conveyance
of a shop was held not to pass title to a cellar beneath, which had been
separately demised; and Press v. Parker, 2 Bing. 456 (1825), where a
demise of all of a messuage "now in the occupancy of E." was held not
to preclude the giving of evidence that a cellar below had been used in
connection with an adjoining messuage, and passed with the latter and
not the former. In both cases the language of the conveyance implied
such a limitation of the vertical extent of the subject of the conveyance as
to result in a division of what would have been normally conveyed as a
unit.
Counsel for the successful- party also cited Kerslake v. White, 2 Stark.
508 (1819), where, in holding that a demise of a messuage included only
the rooms occupied together at one and the same time, Abbott, L.C..,
said: "It frequently happens that a room of one house extends over bart
of a room belonging to another's house." Ibid. 509.
81 Corbett v. Hill, supra note 29, at 673.
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of air above the room upon which the supposed trespass has
been made." 22
He therefore dismissed the bill.
The statements that the projecting room was "carved out
of the freehold" of the defendant, and that the column of air
above it still "remained in the ownership" of the defendant,
would seem to demonstrate that the Vice-Chancellor identified
the landspace as a part of the freehold, and admitted that it
could be the subject of ownership.3 As a consequence of these
views, he in effect recognized that here a verLically limited por-
tion of the space was the subject of an ownership distinct from
that of the space above and below its'
-2 Ibi& 674.
s3 The syllabus is in part: "Held, that the vertical column of air over
so much o6 the room as overhung the defendant's site belonged, not to the
plaintiff, but to the defendant."
34 Corbett v. Hill was approved twenty-two years later in Laybourn v.
Gridley, [1892] 2 Ch. 53, but the result -was not followed. Overhung
premises had been conveyed by reference to a ground plan, without other
description. It was held by the court that the overhanging part of the
adjoining premises also passed. As Mr. Justice North said: 'What is
conveyed is the piece of land coloured green, with all the buildings thereon;
that, in the absence of anything else to the contrary, passes everything"
above and below." Ibid. 58 [italics ours].
The learned justice -went on further to clarify Corbett v. Hill: "The de-
fendants claimed not merely the loft as it existed, but they claimed a
right to the space over it They have pulled the loft down and substituted
a new building which . . . extends higher up. In my opinion, even if
the defendants were right as to the ownership of the loft, it would mot
make them owners of the space overhead. Upon that point I think the
case of Corbett v. Hill is conclusive" Ibi,& 59. This dictum suggests that
-where a situation arises governed by Corbett v. Hill, the projecting room
may be torn down and another built in its place provided it occupies no
more space than the original projection.
Corbett v. Hill was again referred to in Newton v. Huggins & Co., 50
Sol. J. 617 (1906). The plaintiff was the fee owner of four dwelling rooms
built over an archway. He claimed that the -wall of the defendant's ad-
joining house, which was also one side of the archway, was a party waiL
Neville, J., held that it was a party wall only to the extent of the rooms
above the archway, but not below the rooms. He said, at 617: "Corbett
v. Hill shewed that when other property was interposed the right to the
solum was limited to the extent'to which the premises protrude; therefore
plaintiff's rights were confined."
In Ranchod Sharnji v. Abdulabbai IMithabbai, 28 Ind. L. IL Bomb. 428
(1904), the plaintiff asked -or a mandatory injunction for the removal of
a superstructure built over certain of the plaintiff's beams which had been
projected over the defendant's land. It was denied on the authority of
Corbett v. Hill.
In Potts v. Bovine, 16 Ont, Rep. 152 (1888), a testatrix had owned two
buildings, with a lane or gangway between. One was built so that the
second story extenaed over the lane. The other, together with the surface
of the soil over which the lane ran, -was devised to the plaintiff subject
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A few years later, the Court of Chancery Appeals was con-
fronted, in Reiffly v. Booth,85 with a slightly different situation.
A covered passage or gateway led through a house from a street
to a garden behind the house. The premises in the rear were
conveyed "together with the exclusive use of the gateway." There
were rooms abovi the way, and a vault beneath, not granted. Gen-
eral Booth, the grantee, and his Salvation Army then proceeded
to fill its walls with prints, and to place chairs and tables in it.
The grantor sought to restrain this use as inconsistent with a
grant only of an easement or way. The comments of the judges
on this argument, it is submitted, are inexplicable unless we ac-
c~pt the hypothesis with which this discussion is concerned.
Lord Justice Lopes remarked that "ownership (not an easement)
passed," since "there is no easement known to law that gives
exclusive and unrestricted use of a piece of land." Lord Justice
Cotton compared the grant to that of a set of chambers, and
called it a "conveyance of the property in the passage." Lord
Justice Findley agreed, but added that the grantor of the gate-
way "was reserving to himself that which was above it and was
reserving to himself that which was below it," together with a
right of support in the rooms above the gateway, and that the
grant was different in its vertical limitation from the grant of
the yard in the rear. The syllabus of the case in the Law Re-
ports contains the note that apparently "such a right amounted
to the ownership of the space within the gateway." This view
6f fthe case seems in harmony both with the result and with the
ratio decidendi.
The court does not say anything concerning its attitude had
the passage and its adjuncts been destroyed. General Booth hid
contracted for more than a mere right of way; he had con-
tracted for the property in the space used for the way. It is
consistent with the logic of the case and with the genius of the
law to believe that the destruction of the building through which
the passage had been run would not terminate or dimirnsh his
rights30
Three cases decided by courts of last resort in this country
to a right of ingress and egress by the defendant, the devisee of the building
of which the extending rooms were a part. The plaintiff sought by this
action to get the possession of the rooms over the lane on the theory that
the land, having been devised to him, included all above it. His action was
Tefused, Gait, C.T., holding the presumption rebutted by the facts in the
case. Press v. Parker, supra note 30; Freeland v. Burt, supra note 16;
and Corbett v. Hill, supra note 29, were cited.
35 44 Ch. D. 12 (1890).
-eAn interesting comparison can be made with Riley v. Pearson, 120
TMinn. 210, 139 N. W. 361 (1913), where a perpetual easement to an
arched passage was held to survive the destruction of the building through
-which the passage ran.
[Vol. 39
LANDSPACE ABOVE THE SURFACE
are of great value to an understanding of our proposition. In
the first, Weaver v. Osbomze,-3 the defendant's predecessor in
title owned a two story frame building and the lot on which it
was situated. In 1893, he granted to the plaintiffs property
described as: "All the second story of my store building, com-
mencing thirteen feet from the foundation, .. . size of build-
ing twenty-two by fifty feet." The'description was followed
by mutual covenants to maintain and repair the respective
stories, with mutual rights given each to demand that the
other repair his portion. This sentence followed: "In case of
fire, let it be optional with either party in case of building."
The entire building was destroyed by fire in 1909. The defend-
ant then began to erect another store building on the site of
the one destroyed, but denied the plaintiffs the right to rebuild
the second story. The plaintiffs asked a decree confirming their
right to erect, have, and use a second story on the building be-
gun by the defendant.' On demurrer, the bill was dismissed by
the court below.
On appeal, the court first expressed the belief that, in the
absence of any covenants or language in the conveyances indi-
cating a dilerent intent, title to an upper story, is "title to the
second story then in existence," and ceases with the destruction
of the building "by fire or otherwise." Justice Weaver, writing
the opinion, suggested that in the cases which so intimate we
find qualifications such as "in the absence of contract," so that,
despite the holdings, we may infer that parties have the powet
when exercised to create rights which will survive destruction.P
He construed the clause beginning "In case of fire" as an ex-
pression of such an intention. Neither party was given the
ight to compel the other to rebuild, but in case either chose to
do so the other had the "option" to rebuild his part. Practically,
that put the first election solely up to the lower proprietor, for
37TSupr note 20.
38 The cases he particularly cited were: Jackson v. Brans; Pierce v.
Dyer, both supra, note 20; Association v. Hegele, 24 Ore. 16, 32 Pac. 679
(1893). Association v. Hegele involved a party wall agreement to which
the court denied effect after the servient building had been torn down;
it does not bear on our problem, and was cited only for the analogy which
seemed to the court to e.dst. Pierce v. Dyer was also a party-wall case,
but the opinion contains this general language, when speaking of mutual
rights of support: 'When thus destroyed, it is fair to presume that
the parties intend, in the absence of any agreemcnt, that the ease-
ment shall end with the necessity which created it," 109 Mass. at 377.
Jackson v. Bruns is the only one of the three cases which deals with an
actual instance of story ownership. In it we find the following language:
"If the defendanAi does not desire to restore his walls to a sound and safe
condition for his own benefit he ought not to be compelled to maintain
them for the benefit of plaintiff, in the absence of arj czpress or implicd
contract on his part." 129 Iowa at 623, 106 N. W. at 3. [Italics ours]
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he alone could build without his neighbor. Since in the present
case the lower proprietor had started rebuilding, his superjacent
neighbor could demand the right to rebuild the second, story.
The case was reversed.
The defendant's new building was of slightly different dimen-
sions than the old, its length being greater. The court, how-
ever, limited the new second story to the dimensions set out in
the conveyance. Does not this, as well as the general result,
lead us to the belief that the conveyance was of the title to a
portion df space twenty-two by fifty feet in lateral extent, be-
ginning thirteen feet above the foundations of the old building
and extending upward, either to the height of the old second
story, or indefinitely further? 31
That the landspace was divided by a horizontal plane thirteen
30 The author of the note to this case in (1913) 38 L. RI. A. (N. a.)
706, found no parallel cases, but approved the decision.
In the conveyance involved in the two cases entitled MeConnel v. Kibbe,
supra. notes 19 and 20, there was the following provision: "McConnel to
have, use, and occupy the said buildings -bove the first story aforesaid
forever, and in case of the destruction of the said buildings or either
of them, said McConnel to have the right to make and continue up walls
upon walls which may be made for any new. building to any height con-
sistent with safety of the building." .This provision apparently never came
to an appellate court for construction, but it ghows that such a situation
as that which caused the litigation in Weaver v. Osborne may occur more
than once.
Our hypothesis concerning the result of Weaver v. Osborne suggests some
interesting problems:
t. If the conveyance passed title to an upper stratum of space, and
that title was not defeated by the destruction of the building, it is logical
to believe that any use of the land by tl~e lower owner, other than such a
rebuilding as gave the plaintiffs the right to demand support for a now
second story which would have resulted in a projection more than thirteen
feet above the surface,*would have been a trespass on the plaintiff's domain.
2. Suppose the defendants had not elected to rebuild, would the plain-
tiffs' title ever be lost? Possibly the court might hold that possession
of. the surface by the defendants would, by a constructive adverse posses-
sion, eventually reunite the titles after the limitations period, since it
would hardly be possible for the plaintiffs to assert their possession of this
unattainable and intangible property. This result would be opposed, how-
ever, to the Scoits decision, Urquhart v. Marshall, infra note 60, and
possibly to the general rule that possession of the surface does not con-
stitute adverse possession of separately owned unworked minerals below.
The property in space has little or no economic value under present con-
ditions until the election of the lower owner to rebuild. This emphasizes
the importance of the right to require support for a structure, enabling
use of the property to be made. In fact, as may be implied' from much
of the argument in Iredale v. Loudoun, supra note 24, the rule that title
to an upper story is ordinarily defeated by destruction of the building
really rests upon the practical consideration that the right to support is
lost and the property has no economic value. It is a pragmatic, not a
logical, rule.
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feet above the soil is at most only an inference to be drawn from
the legal effect of the conveyance involved in Wever v. Osborne.
Pearsonz. v. Matheson -0 is a parallel case in which it was express-
ly recognized that the upper owner had a title to the space itself
which would survive destruction of the original building. The
conveyance was of an undeveloped block, with a contemporane-
ous contract made a part of it whereby the grantee was to erect
a one story store-room not over fourteen feet in height and. the
grantor was to erect a hotel over the store-room. In case- of
fire, provisionwas made for rebuilding within twelve months,
the expenses to be pro-rated. The grantor and grantee later
entered into a separate contract by which a skylight was provided
for the benefit of the grantee. The grantee subsequently con-
veyed the lot and store; a fire followed; and a dispute arose when
the rebuilding was planned.
It was argued that the deed and the first contrack which had
been made a part of it, were repugnant, and hence that the con-
tract permitting the erection of the hotel was void. Ir. Justice
Gage said:
"The two together plainly evince the intent of the parties to
confine Watson's [the grantee's] tenure to the soil of the lot
granted and fourteen feet above it; and to reserve to Matheson[the grantor] the use of all that space which lay above the
fourteen foot line parallel to and above the soil. The only issue,
if there be any issue, is whether such a contract may be made." 41
On the analogy of grants of mines and the like, the justice held
that a conveyance of what he called "that aerial part of the lot
lying above a line parallel to the earth and fourteen feet above
the earth"- could be made. Consequently there was no repug-
nance between the deed and the first contract.
Attention then centered on the later contract for a skylight.
The Justice pointed out that:
"So far as the deed and concurrent contract show, a solid floor
and rooms on it may have been constructed immediately above
Pearson's store, and in that event a skylight would not have been
possible of construction." 42
But Matheson accepted a valuable consideration from Watson,
and agreed with him and, his assigns to permit the skylight in
the existing building or in others replacing it. The court held
that the right created survived both Watson's death and the
40102 S. C. 377, 86 S. E. 1063 (1915). Althoigh the case was decided
after Weaver v. Osborne, supra note 20, the Iowa decision apparently was
not called to the attention of the court
41I. 382, 86 S. E. at 1064.
-12Ibf5d 382-383, 86 S. E. at 1065.
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destruction of the building, adding: "If Watson's right must
have a name, then it was an easement in Matheson's dominion
of the air over the fourteen foot line." '
Here is an indisputable instance of such a stratification of
the landspace as we have been seeking. 3 As it was- phrased
in the opinion of the court, "Matheson was sovereign og the air
over the Watson store which lay above the fourteen foot line."
His right was independent of the existence of any structure
occupying the space which belonged to him.
One further point of interest should be noted. Unlike the
conveyances which have been the basis of the other cases, the one
here was made before any bilding had been erected to identify
the aerial lot. The lot was described by its relation to the sur-
face of the soil and not by its relation to something man-made. 4'
43 This is the interpretation which others have given this decision. A
note to this case, entitled The Air Space a.s Corporeal Realty in (1916)
29 HARv. L. Rav. 525, after citing examples of the separate ownership of
6hambers, stated the problem in this wise:
"When a building thus owned is destroyed, a question arises whether
an owner of a portion of it who had no rights in the soil can claim the
space formerly occupied by his property. . . . An estate in fee may also
be intended to embrace only a portion of the building, itself and not the
space it occupies; but the question still remains whether ownership of
-unattached air space is possible where a clear attempt is made to create
it!' Ibid. 525.
The commentator believed that Pearson v. Matheson, supra note 40,
answered the question in the affirmative. Tiffany is of the same opinion,
for he says (speaking of the separate ownership of chambers):
"Whether the owner of land, in the ordinary case, actually owns the
air space above the land, and whether such air space is susceptible of
division into strata for the purpose of separate ownership, is a question
of difficulty. That it is so divisible appears to have been decided in one
case" (referring to Pearson v. Mtatheson). 1 TnrFANY; op. cit. supra, note
6, at 865, § 251.
44 The facts of Pearson v. Matheson, supra note 40,--the erection of a
hotel by one party above a building belonging to another-make relevant
mention of what has been called "Cleveland's sky lease." MOiXOHAn=,
LONG TERm LAND LEASEHOLDS (1921) 19 et seq. One Brown built a five
story building on a frontage leased for a long term. He leased to the
Cleveland Athletic Club for ninety-nine years the space above his building,
granting easements of access through stairways and elevators. The Club
thereupon erected an eight story building on top of Brown's structure.
The club pays taxes on its portion of the building, but has no ground
taxes to meet. At the end of the ninety-nine years of the lease from
Brown, the latter, his assigns or successors, must pay the club or its
successors the appraised value of the club's portion of the building as it
then exists and adds to the value of the land. The owners of the reversion
to the land have joined in the lease so as to guarantee Brown's perform-
ance. The nature of the lease is apparent from a reading of it, especially
the granting clause, which is in part as follows:
"Whereas, the Lessee desires to acquire the right to construct and main-
tain upon said building now in course of erection by said Lessor and upon
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The Pearson case was cited a few years later in. Taftv . W&&-
ington- MutuaZ Savings Ban," a Washington case. Under a.
statute of the state, property held in fee by a city reverted to
the abutting property owners when vacated. Another statute
authorized the vacation of a street or alley or any part thereof
without limitation. A municipal corporation owned the fee to
an alley. Property owners on both sides of a portion of the
alley wished to erect a building extending in its upper stories
over the alley. To enable this to be done, the municipality by-
ordinance vacated that portion of the alley which extended in.
definitely upward from a horizontal plane sixteen feet above
the surface of the alley. Other property owners along the alley
objected when the building was commenced, but the procedure
was upheld on appeal. 1Afr. Justice Holcomb fast suggested that
the municipality owned the space vacated; then, referring to
the Pearson case,'he concluded that the landspace thus owned
could be divided, as had in effect been done, by the municipality.
II'
The recognition by the common law of fees in chambers and
stories leads us to inquire whether the growing practice in the
larger cities of "selling" apartments in so-called co-operative
buildings depends upon such a principle of law. In popular
any other building which, may hereafter be constructed or erected upon.
said premises additional stories and improvements, together with the right.
of suitable access thereto . . . :" The lease is set out in XCMIccN , op.
s pra at 158-170.
When lawyers are drafting instruments such as these, w;hen situations
are arising which require leases of this sort, when the right to build many-
stories becomes valuable beyond what "was considered possible a few years
ago, it seems inevitable that the courts will be confronted in a practical
form -with the question which has been more or less academically discussed.
in this paper.
The taxation feature of the Cleveland "sky lease" is reminiscent of the.
case of Cincinnati College v. Yeatman, 30 Oh. St. 276 (1876), where there
was a lease of apartments occupying the front of a second stor3 for ten
thousand years renewable forever, the lessor to rebuild as before in case
of ffie with the same rights in the lessee. The court granted a mandamus
on the suit of the lessor compelling the separate taxation of the apartments.
as distinct property, because there was an Ohio statute making long term
leaseholds governable by the same rules of law as if they vwere fees.
4 127 Wash. 503, Z21 Pac. 604 (1923).
48 It has been pointed out that this procedure could not be Tollowed in.
other jurisdictions because of the rights in the remaining owners along-
the street or alley to light and air as -well as passage which those juris-
dictions recognize. Bell, Air Rights (1928) 23 ILL. L. Buy. 250, 256. This
consideration does not destroy or impair the value of the Washington de-
cision as an authority in support of. the right to divide land into horizontal.
strata.
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discussion, in the talk of real estate salesmen, and in the minds
of the dwellers therein, these apartments are frequently, if not
usually, treated as separate properties. In this lies their sales
value; they are a satisfaction of the desire to be a freeholder
and not a tenant, which is our inheritance from a society dif-
ferently circumstanced. It is a desire difficult of fruition when
cities have so grown that we must build many feet skyward in
order to utilfze the full value which we conceive our lands to
possess. Yet, oddly enough, the cooperatives, while attaining the
practical result, do so by the use of a legal device which directly
negatives ownership. The reasons for this have been concisely
indicated by Mr. Castle; who has written the only adequate
discussion of them from the strictly legal viewpoint:
"The idea of describing real property for purposes of convey-
ance as a certain room or rooms in a building may be compara-
tively unfamiliar, but there is nothing theoretically impossible
about it. However, the ends . . . could be attained, if at all,
only by a complicated series of agreements, uncertain in opera-
tion and lacking in 'teeth.' Each apartment owner, would,
among other things, be confronted with the practical difficulty,
if not impossibility, of arranging to have his individual apart-
ment insured separately and assessed separately for taxation." 41
The same writer then points out the practical difficulties of any
arrangement in the nature of a joint tenancy. He finally con-
cludes:
"The objective can be attained, therefore, only by providing
some agency which will serve as a repository for the entire legal
title, and which will issue to the apartment purchasers appro-
priate instruments evidencing their respective rights and inter-
ests in the property and binding them by the act of acceptance
to the obligations already mentioned." 48
According to Mr. Castle, only two such, forms of organization,
which he calls the "corporation plan" and the "trust plan," have
been found reasonably adequate. In the first, a corporation, of
whatever sort is permitted under the statutes of the state to
own real estate and build thereon, is created with the prospective
owners as stockholders. The corporation takes the title to the
land, handles the financing (by mortgage or trust deed), and
gives to each "owner" a "proprietary lease" of that apartment
47 Castle, Ldgal P7=es ofi Co-operative Buildings (1928) 2 So. CAI1F.
REV. 3.
A description is to be found in CLAAR, COOPrRArTIV APARTITENT HOUSEs
AS AN INVESTMENT (Northwestern Univ. School of Commerce, 1924) 14-16.
Mr. Claar is also the author of the chapter on these buildings in DfAc-
CHuSNEY, REAL EsTATE LAW (1927) Ch. VIII.
48 Castle, loo. cit. suprd note 47.
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which is to be his. T, the second, a similar result is achieved
with the substitution, of trustee's certificates for share certifi-
cates'
Both plans are adaptations of. our legal mechanism to a novel
sitaion. Complexities always result from such adaptations,
and this instance is no exception. The "proprietary" leases are
exceptionally long-winded instruments, quite terrifying at times
to the layman 9 Despite this difficulty, the co-operatives seem
to be increasing in favour and multiplying in number. Simpli-
fication will be the inevitable result.
While we find here no apparent encouragement for our prop-
osition that the landspace can be stratified, and the resulting
divisions separately owned, the phenomenon of the cooperative
apartment has this important consequence: Just as the willing-
ness of the courts to admit that a chamber could be separately
conveyed resulted from the accustoming of the judges to the
notion by the practical examples surrounding them in the Inns
of Cornt, so will our courts of tomorrow cease to regard as
strange the ownership of castles in the air many stories above
the streets. Mr. Castle regards the right of the dweller in these
apartments as "practical ownership" (whatever that is), and
cites an opinion of the Attorney-General of Minnesota to show
49 See Castle, op. cit. supra note 47. A number of forms, from New
York, Chicago, and California, are set out in CuTTLER TiFrA l's Fom
BOOK (Cutler's 2d ed. 1927) 567 et seg. Several matters which appear
therein have a particular interest for us. Thus, in the proprietary lease
given as a New York form we find that it is provided that the lease shall
cease in case of the total destruction of the building by fire, " . . . unless
the insurer shall elect to rebuild same building under the terms of any
provisions which may be contained in their policies of inmnce, in which
case this lease shall not terminate but shall continue and apply in respect
to the premises in said building so rebuilt, which shall correspond with
the premises hereby demised." Ibid 573. A similar provision is contained
in the Chicago form. Ib& 586.
In the California forms, which provide for a trustee as the eventual
repository of title, there is a provision that there shall be issued: " .
a certificate of beneficial ownership under said trus% issued by said trustee,
showing the buyer's undivided fractional beneficial interest in the building
and real property as a whole, and his exclusive right of occupancy under
the trust of the said apartment hereinabove designated." Ib 597. Occa-
sionally the language goes further: "The buyer . . . agrees to purchase
apartment no......- on the ...... floor of said proposed building, as
designated on the floor plan of said proposed building , . . .'
Speadng of these arrangements, it has been said: "The purchaser of a
co-operative apartment buys shares of stock in the corporation to an
amount equal to the equity covering the apartment he has selected.
Actually he buys developed air-rights when he buys an apartment." Bur-
ritt, From the Groundi Up (1928) 54 MVAtG. OF Bus. 39. This is the inevit-
able reaction of the layman.
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that he has companions in his belief. Thus is the ground pre-
pared for seed perhaps already sown.
IV
Separate ownership of chambers, such as the common law
permits, finds few counterparts in those countries where the
civil law governs. The Roman system has always been firmly
wedded to the belief that where nature has indicated unity the
law should not countenance division. The column of landspace
has seemed to the Roman lawyer to possess the indicia of unity,
and the two familiar maxims of land law, superficies solo cedit,
and cujus est solum, ejuA est usque ad coelum, have found un-
qualified acceptance by civil lawyers50
In Germany, however, the Roman law has not always been
predominant. The old Germanic conceptions were more akin to
the spirit of the common law, and many times were incompatible
with the alien notions introduced by the Reception. From the
1100's on story or roomage ownership was widespread. Hueb-
ner describes it as follows:
"Houses were horizontally divided, and the specific parts so
created-the stories, floors, and cellars-were held by different
persons in separate ownership; this being associated, as a rule,
with community ownership of the building site and the portions
of the building (walls, stairs, roof, etc.) that were used in
common." 5
The tenacity of the institution is indicated by its survival after
the Reception in many localities. Huebner cites as an example
a contract drawn in 1901 between a municipality and a cathedral
building endowment. The enabling act of the German Civil Code
expressly recognized continuance of property in building-stories
existing at the time the Code became effectiveP2 The institution
flourished in Switzerland, and the same attitude toward it was
taken by the Swiss Civil Code 3
Property in stories and in parts of stories has been commonly
recognized by the Scottish courts, although the system they
administer is of Roman origin. A considerable body of law has
been evolved. The origin of the rules does not clearly, appear.
0 0See HA2ELTIm, op. cit. supra note 30, at 74-75: " . . . the Roman
law permitting no ownership in limited stratum of soil or airspace, but
allowing only the landowner's full dominium or ownership to be encum-
bered by certain rights less than ownership?'
51HUEBNER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 174; of. SOIIUSTER, PRINOPLuS OF
"GAR tArc CiviL LAW (1907) 413, § 349.
52 G n~ CrvNM CODE (1900) § 128.
5 3 SwIss CIvi CODE (1907) § 675.2.
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Several cases have a particular interest for us, both because
they throw light upon the nature of the property and because
they foreshadow situations which may some day come before
our own courts.
In Dennisozm v. BeU, -  decided by the Court of Session in
1824, the respondent sought to convert the under floors of a
tenement into shops. The advocator, who owned an upper floor,
resisted the application made by the respondent to the
Dean of Guild for authority to make the alteration on two
grounds: (1) The alterations were of such a nature as to create
a reasonable degree of alarm for the safety of the upper floors.
(2) The upper owner's consent was necessary because his right
in the inferior part of the tenement partook of the nature of
common property. An architect reported to the court adversely
to the first contenti6n. The court adhered to the granting of
the warrant, holding that the question of danger to the upper
tenement was the sole one involved, thus denying that the right
of the upper owner in the inferior portion of the house was
more than a servitude of support.r
The facts in Stewart v. Blaac.kwood,;G decided five years later,
were somewhat different. The defender in the action was the
proprietor of the second and third floors and of the garret of a
building in Glasgow situated over a ground floor belonging to
the pursuer. The -original building was torn down in 1823
pursuant to an order of condemnation of the Dean of Guild.
54 2 Shaw 649 (1824).
5 Two decisions a year earlier had prepared the -way. In Sandy v. Innes,
2 Shaw 195 (1823), Sandy owned an upper flat and attic. He sought to
extend a common stair to the fiat up to the attic, and to convert the attic
into separate dwellings. The original stair to the attic ran from inside
the upper floor. The lower owners sought an interdict. The Court of
Session, while continuing the interdict granted below, required a trial on
it.
In McKean v. Davidson, 2 Shaw 426 (1823), Davidson, the proprietor
of the lower part of a house the upper part of which belonged to McKean,
sought to convert the sunk and first floors into shops. To do this, the
front walls had to be removed and the upper wall supported by props.
The Dean of Guild granted a warrant for so doing if Davidson would
find caution de dannis. To this decision the Court of Session adhered.
This decision thus went further than the Sandy case, although the advo-
cator (MeKean) had relied on the Sandy ease.
After Dennistoun v. Bell, supra note 54, had been decided, its principle
was followed and extended in Grey v. Greig, 4 Shaw 105 (1825). This was
another application to the Dean of Guild for warrant to convert sunk and
street flats into shops. It was granted with a qualification that Greig
should find caution de damnis, and the Court of Session adhered after a
report by an architect that the alteration could be made -without apparent
risk. The advocatbr had also raised the point of the effect on the value
of her property, but the result was not changed.
so7 Shaw 362 (1829).
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The litigation arose to determine the rights of the parties in the
new building to be erected on the site of the old. The pursuer
wanted to make a sunk story in the new building, in the part
not occupied by the common passage, so as to give him both the
street floor and such sunk story. He therefore raised aA action
of declarator of title to have it found that he was the exclusive
proprietor of the "solum" or soil beneath the part of the ground
floor which belonged to him. The defender pleaded that she
had a real right in the "solum," and was a joint proprietor in
it; and that "she was not bound in law to submit to have in the
new building merely a third story, instead of a second as pos-
sessed by her in the former tenement." The Lord Ordinary
sustained the defenses and granted an interlocutor.
When the- case came before the Court of Session, the Lord
Ordinary's interlocutor was adhered to, Lord Glenlee saying:
"The right of the proprietor of the lower flat is not a right
of absolute and exclusive property in the solum, burdened with
a servitude oneris ferendi; and though the solum may not be,
strictly speaking, joint property, yet there is in it a joint interest
sui generis, which prevents any one of the proprietors of a
house from doing anything to the prejudice of the rest." ST
Throughout the case it was assumed that in the event .of such a
destruction as had taken place the pioprietors of the several
57 Ibid. 363. What the phrases "joint interest" and "joint property,"
or "common interest" and "common property" mean in these discussions
is better to be understood from the language of the opinions in Gollatly v.
Arrol, 1 Macph. 592 (1863), where the question was raised as to the right
of the upper proprietor (the defender) to cut through his side walls to
make openings into adjoining buildings. The Lord Justice-Clerk (Lord
Inglis), after pointing out that each owner had a right of property in
the part of the gable bounding his own property, and: an interest in the
rest for carrying up the vents or chimneys for his parts, said:
"It may be difficult to say what the nature of this right is, whether it
is a right of common property or a common interest. I am not sure that
the line between these different rights is well defined; but . . . I am
inclined to lean to the opinion that it is common interest and not common
property. Such was the principle iA the judgment in the case of Stewart
v. Blackwood." Ibid. 599.
Lord Cowan, concurring, nevertheless inclined to a different view. Do-
fining the terms, he said:
"Professor Bell has stated the difference between common interest and
common property to be this-that where the right is that of common inter-
est merely, and where no case of danger has been made out, the Courts
have authorized alterations to be made; whereas if the right be one of
common property, no one can touch the subject of common property so as
to innovate on its character without the consent of all the other pro-
prietors." Ibid. 601.
The right td cut through was denied in the case, because actual danger
was shown. The other justices did not commit themselves on the nature
of the rights.
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stories had a right to the same portion of the rebuilt structure
as they owned before the destruction. The decision is based on
the belief that they were entitled to take their portion of the
new building burdened with no greater servitudes than had at-
tached to their portion of the old, and thab the changing of the
second story into a third story changed the burden of the servi;
tudes.
The court does not clearly define the nature of the interest of
the several parties in the "solum." Apparently the evidence
failed to show clearly by the title deeds in whom the title to
the "solum" or land itself was, whether in the pursuer or some
third party. It is possible that the land was still retained by
the original builder, who had conveyed away the properties in
the building without mention of the "solum."
The decision seems reasonable if based on no other proposi-
tion than that, even if the pursuer had owned the soil, he should
not by his use of it be permitted to multiply the easements which
burdened the defender's property.50
That we are dealing with clear instances of the separation of
landspace into horizontal strata seems a necessary inference
from the decision in Urqulmurt v. M .s/l.,0 The title deeds to
both the upper and lower tenements described them as bounded
by the street in front. As originally built, they did not extend
that far forward, a sunk area intervening. The lower owner
first paved over the sunk area, then built out to the street, and
this case arose upon an application by the upper owner for leave
to extend his tenement out over this new erection. Two bases
for objection to the application were upheld by the Dean of
*SErskine, the commentator, confesses to obscurity as to the import of
this and the other cases dealing with the rights of the proprietors in the
soil. ERSHINE, PRINCUILES OF THE L.w OF SCOTLAND (20th ed. 1903) bk.
11, tit. ix, § 8, P. 204.
50 The extent to which property irt a story could be used as suited the
proprietor is shown by a later decision, Anderson v. Saunders, 9 Shaw
564 (1831). In 1825 Saunders purchased a shop or street story and the
sunk story of a tenement. The upper three stories belonged to separate
proprietors, amofig them being Anderson. The common stair extended
to the sunk story, and to the cellars below apportioned to the various
proprietors, but there was also an inside stair -from the shop to the sunk
story. Previous to Saunders' purchase the shop and sunk floors were
occupied as one tenement. Saunders, however, let out the sunk floor as
a separate dwellingg having his tenants use the outer, common stair. The
proprietors of the upper stories asked for an interdict to force the use
of the shop stairway by these new tenants. The Court'of Session recalled
the interdict granted by the Lord Ordinary, holding that the conveyance
to Shunders, -which was of "all and whole the shop story and sunk story
immediately below the same, etc., with the cellars below, the common
stair leading to the said sunk floor, . . . "permitted such a use.
0 16 DunL "307 (1853).
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Guild but were denied on appeal both by the Lord Ordinary and
by the Court of Session:
(1) The seven year's occupancy of the under shop gave a
possessory title a coelo of the space in front of the upper tene-
ment. Answering this argument, the Lord Ordinary (Lord
Curriehill) said:
"The respondents, howeve'r, so far from having established
exclusive possession of that space for the last seven years, have
not proven, nor even alleged, a single act of possession on their
part of that space within that period. On the contrary, that
space appears to have ieen hitherto entirely vacant, excepting
in so far as it has been occupied by the advocators themselves
and their tenants. The advocators state, and the fact does not
appear to be disputed, that for a much longer period they and
their tenants have occupied a considerable portion of that space,
by the windows of their shop having been made to project into
it, and by a balcony belonging to them having been made to
project over it. . .. The Dean of Guild's judgment accordingly
sets forth, not that there is any evidence of such possession of
this space by. the respondents, but merely that they have been
in possession of it because of their possession of another space
which is beneath it and adhered to their own shops. But this
is not a logical inference." 61
The Lord Ordinary was sustained on this ground without the
Court of Session deeming comment necessary.
(2) The objectors alleged that they were owners of the
ground forming the sunk area, and as such were owners of all
the vacant space perpendicularly above it. Therefore they could
prohibit any intrusion into that space. The Lord Ordinary gave
two answers to this: (&) The ground story which respondents
owned was bounded in altitude, and this limit in altitude affected
the space over the sunk area as well as that contained in the
ground floor. (b) If the title of the respondents ran to the
street, so also did the title of the advocators. The Lord Ordinary
said:
"And it follows that if that boundary, when applied to the
lower story, would import its extension over the vacant space
'between its side Wall and Princes Street, the same boundary,
when applied to the upper story, would also import its extension
over the vacant space between its side wall and that street." 12
'The Lord Ordinary was cautious, however, and stated that he
was not deciding definitely that the space belonged to the upper
owner, but only that it did not belong to the lower proprietor.
This seems excessive Scots caution.
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this division of his holding. The court must have regarded the
conveyance by which the upper proprietor acquired his title as
,one of a horizontally defined portion of landspace some of which
was not occupied by any structure.P
In A'rol v. Inckes,6 4 where the owner of the upper three
stories of a building likewise sought to extend them over an
addition built by the proprietor of the soil and first story in
space formerly unoccupied between the original building and
the lot line, the court held that the upper proprietor could not
do so. Here the conveyance to the upper proprietor was of
4 storeys," without other specified boundaries. The inference
is that the property of upper proprietors is strictly limited to
the space occupied by the portion of the structure identifying
it in the conveyance, unless there is other descriptive language,
extending the boundaries of the upper stratum.0
The same inference may be drawn from the decision in Watt
-v. Burgess's Tntstee.a The owner of an attic story wanted to
tear it away and build two stories in its place. His right to do
so was denied, and the following arguments were advanced by
Lord McLaren in support of the decision:
"... . the first proprietor of the undivided tenement had, to-
gether with the tenant, the right of indefinite extension of his
use of this fraction of the earth's surface upwards and down-
wards, without any limitations except such as result from phys-
ical difficulties .... He parted with that right only to the extent,
so far as the petitioner is concerned, of conveying to the pur-
suer's predescessor in title a stratum of ten or twelve feet in
height, defined as a storey in the tenement. I am unable to find,
in a conveyance so defined, any possibilities of extension against
the will of the proprietor from whom the conveyance proceeds.
The estate of the pursuer is merely a stratum conveyed out of
the larger estate, which extends theoretically from the center of
the earth upwards, and it follows in my opinion that whatever
is not conveyed remains with the grantor. It is true that the
grantor is not himself entitled to build above the pursuer's
storey. But this disability, as it appears to me, is the result of
implied contract, because a proprietor who has sold a subject
described as the uppermost of a certain number of storeys could
-It -was intimated by Lord Rutherfurd in the Court of Session that,
before the lower owner had built, the upper owner could not have con-
structed overhanging balconies or done anytbing with ]is space obstructing
or inconveniencing his neighbor below. This is only the recognition of
easements which are reasonable and natural in such-a situation.
6414 Retiie 394, 24 Scot. L. R. 287 (1887).65 Compare this case with the part of the decision in Weaver v. Osborne,
supra note 20, which limited the right of the lodge trustees in rebuilding
to the extent of the originaLupper story conveyed to them.
P618 Rettie 766, 28 Scot. L. R. 496 (1891).
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not, without derogating from his grant, put an additional storey
on to the tenement." 6 7
Several dicta in the case recognize that, if the building had to
be rebuilt, it "must either be rebuilt according to the original
design, or ... each proprietor should be entitled to duplicate
his storey."
. The Scottish decisions recognize that the owner of the upper
story has title to the roof, so as to enable him to cut holes
through it and to make other uses of it not inconsistent with the
limitations of his title already suggested.0 8 The courts of Scot-
67 Ibid. 769, 28 Scot. L. R. at 499. This language is reminiscent of the
passage in Corbett v. Hill, supra note 29, which speaks of the protruding
room as carved out of the freehold, and the decision accords with the
dictum in Laybourn v. Gridey, supra note 34. The implied contract pre-
venting the owner who had conveyed the uppermost story from adding
another carries the logic a step further than the English cases.
as This is so even when the ownership of the topu story is divided. San-
derson's Trustees v. Yule, 25 Rettie 211, 35 Scot. L. R. 140 (1897). This
case also is interesting in its holding that the lower owners are bound to
contribute to the upkeep of the roof, which seems to be contra to the
American rule and the probable English rule. See supra note 20.
This rule resulted in one decision somewhat modifying the result in Watt
v. Burgess's Trustee, supra note 66. In Taylor v. Dunlop, 11 Macph.
25, 26 (1872), the petitioner was the ultimate grantee from the builder of
"all and whole the second or upper flat of the tenement," while the res-
pondent was the ultimate grantee of the tenement "excepting . .. all
and whole the second or upper flat." The roof extended from a gable
wall on one side higher than the roof of the second story, and enclosed
an attic space never occupied. The petitioner sought license to run a
stairway to this attic space and cut it into rooms, and also to cut skylights
in the roof above. It -was not disputed but that the improvements could
be made without injury to the lower flat. The right of an owner to change
the character of the building was recognized, as in Anderson v. Saunders,
supra note 59. As to the right of the upper owner to this attic space,
there was a division of the court. The majority held that the petitioner
owned the roof and the space beneath it; therefore he could make any use
of it he wished to make. Lord President Inglis, dissenting, said:
"The property in the roof and in everything above the jousts of the
upper flat remained in Mr. Campbell (the builder). The only thing he
had given out was the second or upper flat of his tenement. Now 1. do
not think that it is necessary here to consider any general question of
law applicable to such tenements. The whole of the case depends upon
the construction of the titles, and I do not think that there is any difficulty
as to the general law. If the floor here disponed had been an attic floor,
there is no doubt that the roof would have been the property of the dis-
ponce, because, as Lord Deas has said, the roof would be the wall of his
house; but when the disponee is not the owner of the space between the
roof and the ceiling of his house, what right of property can he have in
the roof itself?"
He pointed to the conveyances and also to the fact that the maintenance
and upholding of the roof was expressly cast upon the petitioner, whereas
[Vol. 39
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land have passed on the rights of story proprietors in a number
of other cases, which deal mostly with rights in areas, staircases,
and other appurtenances of the building, and have no direct
importance in this inquiry. 0
France likewise seems to have relaxed the severity of the
Roman presumptions. The French Civil Code by implication
permits the ownership of stories or rooms. Article 553, which
follows the codification of the maxim cuju. est solur, ejus est
vusqe a coelum in Article 552, provides that all buildings or
other structures shall be presumed to have been, built by the
owner of the soil, and to belong to him, "if the contrary be ot
proven"10 The rebuttability of the presumption implies the
possibility of separate and divided ownership in erections, and
the law is so understood. As one French commentator phrases
it, " . .the different stories of one house can belong to dif-
ferent persons." - Story ownership can be created either by
contract or by adverse possession.1 2
One who thus owns a building or part of a building on the
land of another is known as a superficidire, and the right by
which he holds it the droit de suzperficie. 3 This is an adaptation
at common law if it had been his he would have been so bound anyway.
This dissent commends itself as the sounder view.
- Graham v. Greig, 1 DunI. 171 (1838); Johnston v. White, 4 Bettie
721, 14 Scot. L. R. 472 (1877) ; Barclay v. LicEwen, 7 Bettie 192, 17 Scot.
L. R. 558 (1880); Boswell v. Magistrates of Edinburgh, 8 Bettie 986, 18
Scot. L. R. 708 (1881); Sutherland v. Barbour, 15 Bettie 62 (1887); Todd
v. Wilson, 22 Bettie 172, 32 Scot. L. R. 112 (1894).70 
"Toutes constructions, plantations, et ouvrages sur un terrain ou
dans lint rieur sont prisums faits par le propri6taire, A ses frais, et lui
appartenir, si le contraire 7'est pas prozt v6 ' FENcH CWIVL CODS (1803)
art. 553.
7 1"Les divers 4tages d'une maison peuvent appartenir h. des personnes
diffdrentes: BATIDuY-LACANTImRIS, DEs BIENs § 201. The remark
is made in the course of a discussion of joint ownership, for the purpose
of showing that all cases -where property in a thing is divided between
many are not instances of co-proprietorship. Emphasizing this, the author
adds:
"Nous avons, non plusleurs copropriftaires, ayant sur )a chose un droit
de m6me nature, mais bien plusieurs propriftaires ayant des droits
diffrents, et par suite aucun ne peut demander le partage, A Ia diffdrence
de ce qui a lieu entre copropriitaires." This is reminiscent of the common
law decisions denying the right to partition, cited supra note 19.72 Ardee 553 itself adds to the portion already quoted: ".'. . sans
prejudice de Ia propri6ft qu'un tiers pourrait avoir acquise, ou pourrait
acqu~rir par prescription, soit d'un souterrain sous le batiment d'autrui,
soit de toute autre partie du batithent."
The extent of the right in a particular case is therefore affected by the
terms of the contract creating it, or by the conditions under which it was
acquired by prescription. 1 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT DE LA DISTINCTION DES
BiENs (1861) § 483 qwater, p. 396.
- "Lorsqu'une personne est propridtaire du tr~fonds, tandis qu'une autre
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of terms employed in the Roman law, which, while not admitting
of any exception to the presumption of complete vertical owner-
ship, did recognize a jus in re alienw known as superfilcies. This
was akin to a long-term lease of building land upon payment of
an annual rent, sometimes in perpetuity. On this land the super-
ficiary (superficiaaius) built a house with his own materials and
occupied it. While title to the building passed to the owner of
the soil because superficies solo cedit, the superficiary had a real
right which passed to his heirs and gave him legal possession. It
still remained, however, a jus in re aliena.74
The French law has retained the Roman law terms, but has
vastly changed the legal concept. While the Code provisions
imply that the right exists, nothing is said about the nature of
the right. In consequence there is confusion and argument
among the commentators. Planiol says, frankly, that "the nature
of the right is debated even today." 7r Demolombe adds that it
is regrettable that the Code did not precisely delimit the char-
acter and effects of the right.70 A few students, influenced by
the Roman law, consider it to be no more than a jus in re aliena,
but the majority of textwriters are agreed that it is a jus *i re
proprid, or right of property. Thus even Planiol, more uncertain
than many of the others, speaks of it as un dyoit de fpropriUt.6.
. Baudry-Lacantinerie is more explicit. While admitting that
the Roman superficiary had only un droit reel sur la clOse
d'autrui, he contends that, in French law, he does not have un
simple droit d'usufruct, but truly un droit de proppg7if. His
right is perpetual; unlike a servitude, it is not lost by non.-user.78
The author continues: When a superficiary in France owns an
edifice and another has title to the soil, we do not' have two
parties with undivided interests in the same thing; each is the
a un droit exclusif sur les constructions et plantations adh6ranb h ]a sur-
face du sol, on diV que cette dernibre a un droit de superfico, et on ]a
d6signe parfois du nom de superficiaire," BAUDRY-LACANTINERIl, op. Cit.
supra note 71, § 341.
74See Son i, INsTiTuTus (1907)t §§ 70 et seq. for a description of this
right and of a similar agricultural right, emphyteusis.
Heritable building rights (Erbbaurechte) modeled on the right of super-fces were prevalent in the German law after the Reception. GARmsI, TEa-
SCIENCE OF LAw (1911) 155; SComSTm op. cit. mupre note 51, § 349, p.
412 et seq.
7- "Le caractkre de droit de superficie est contest6 encore de nos jours."1
PLANIOL, TPAva t.AMENTAP (8th ed. 1920) § 2525, p. '781.
7 3DEM0LODIBE loc. cit. supraL note 72.
7 See Planiol's discussion of Laurent's differing interpretation of the
Belgian law. PLA.IO,, op. cit. suyra note 75, § 2526, p. '786.
78 This paragraph is a free translation and paraphrase of language from
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, op. cit. supra& note 71, §§ 341, 343.
The Belgian law limits the duration of the right to fifty years by
statute. Loi nu 16 JANvm 1824.
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owner of a divided part of what was once one immovable, but
the division is not accomplished, as in the case of the partition
of a farm between two heirs, by means of a vertical plane mark-
ing on the soil a horizontal line separating the partitioned prop-
erties; the division is accomplished by means of a horizontal
plane which passes through the foundations of the building or
the roots of the plants.P The owner of the soil has that part
of the immovable situated below the plane, and the superficiary
that which is above. Each one has all the rights and liberties
inherent in ownership over the part belonging to him, condi-
tioned on respect of the rights of the other.
In the very language with which he expresses his analysis,
Baudry-Lacantinerie thus points to the recognition by the French
law of such a vertical division of land as is the subject of our
inquiry. Article 664 of the Code provides:
I
"When different stories of a house belong to different owners,
if the title deeds do not regulate repairs and reconstructions, they
must be made as follows:
"The main walls and roof at the expense of all the owners,
proportionately to the value of the respective stories;
"Each owner the floor on which he walks;
"The owner of the second story, the staircase leading to it; the
owner of the thiid story, his staircase beginning at the second
story; and so on." 81
This section is a further and more explicit recognition of the
possibility of story ownership. 8' Commenting on it Demolombe
tells us that story ownership is prevalent in Grenoble and Ren-
nes, and that examples are also found in Normaudy.6- The most
usual occurrence of it, however, results from the division of an
estate by the heirs after an ancestor's death, or by the testator
in his will. In such a case, the foundations and the outhouses
and appurtenances remain undivided.
Demolombe suggests that three questions about such owner-
ship naturally occur: what are the obligations of the proprie-
tors? what are their rightd? what happens in case of the
destruction of the building? Of these, he points out, only the
73'7a division s'opbre l1'aide d'un plan horizontal qui passe D e-x-
trmit6 des fondations de la maison ou des racined des plantes."80 FRENCH Civm COD (1803) art. 664., Cf. the cases, supra note 20,
which deal with the reciprocal servitude -which are enforced in the corm-
mon law. It will be seen that the French law goes further in enforcing
contribution for repairs of the foundation and roof than does our law.8 1 fDemolombe finds a further recognition of such divided property in.
Article 519, which lists among "immovables by their nature" windmills
even though built over the soil of navigable streams. DE=oomUE op. cit
supra note 72, § 483, ter, p. 394.
11 1 DEmLomE, TaAimu )PS SEavrnnDs (1858) § 425, bi, p. 505.
13Ibi; PLAIIOr, op. cit. supra note 75, § 2522, p. 781.
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first is answered by the Code provisions." If the third were
expressly answered, we would have further light as to the real
nature of the d.oit de superficie.
Demolombe discusses the second question, and from his dis-
cussion some very interesting implications arise. He cites two
decisions holding that the owner of the upper story can build
additional stories. One decision even goes so far as to hold
that the lower owners are bound, in case the walls as they exist
are not strong enough to support the projected stories, to con-
tribute proportionately to rebuilding them. Demolombe, while
professing a hesitancy to question the resolutions of these courts,
doubts the validity of the rule they establish, and cites authority
to a contrary view. He suggests that it is not absolutely correct
to say that the owner of the top story would be the sole owner
of the space above to the heavens, to make any use he pleases
of it, since any additional story places some burden on the lower
proprietors that did not originally exist-not only by weakening
the walls, but by decreasing the value of the property through
increasing the number of inhabitants.95
As to the third question, he points out that no trouble can
arise either when there is agreement among the different owners
as to the advisability of rebuilding, or when they are all satisfied
not to rebuild as before. He refers to authority holding that
rebuilding is required if some desire it, even if the others do not,
and that the expenses are pro-rated, the unwilling losing all right
in the property if not contributing. Demolombe inclines to an
opposite view, believing that the land, in case of disagreement,
should be partitioned proportionately to the value of the different
stories.80 Planiol also suggests that after the destruction of the
building by fire the various owners become co-tenants in the
84 1 DEMOLODIBE, op. cit. supra note 82, § 426, p. 506. This commenta-
tor gives us an interesting discussion of the provisions of Article 604,
which in some ways changed the old law of the realm. He cites a number
of interesting applications of these principles which might profitably be
studied by the common law courts when called upon in the future to pass
upon similar questions. Ibid. §§ 427-435, pp. 506-512.
85 Ibid., esp. p. 515. See for Demolombe's general discussion of the rights
of the proprietors, ibid. §§ 436-439, pp. 512-516. Compare these French
cases with the Scottish decision, Watt v. Burgess's Trustee, supra note 06,
which apparently conflicts with them. Demolombe also'seems to believe
that the holding in such a situation as gave rise to the litigation in the
Scottish cases, Urquhart v. Marshall, supra note 60, and Arrol v. Inches,
supra note 64, would be generally in accord with the result of the former
rather than the latter decision-that is, the stratum of the lot conveyed
would not be laterally limited by the dimensions of the original story.
S DnIE0LOM B, op. cit. supra note 82, pp. 516-518.
One wonders just what is meant by the word "reconstructions" used in
Article 664; why is it not possible to find in it a requirement of rebuilding?
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land as it then stands. 87 If this be the correct view, it follows,
as has been said several times before, that the real subject mat-
ter of the right is the building and not the portion of space it
delimits.
V
One other suggestion of vertical division to be found in the
decisions of common law courts must be briefly noticed. Rights
of way for streets, railroads, transmission lines, and those re-
quired by similar public utilities, are usually in the nature of
easements. Disturbances of easements are actionable wrongs,
and in the case of ways of various kinds questions have often
occurred because of alleged disturbances which did not affect
the surface of the soil over which the way extended. Universally
the courts have refused to recognize actions based on acts which
did not actually interfere with the exercise of the easement, and
the result has been to create an apparent horizontal limit to such
easements, outside of which, because the use did not extend so
far, no act could give rise to an action. The result of the -cases
is to give to an easement of way the appearance of a right to
the use or even possession (when the easement is exclusive) of
a vertically limited portion of the landspace. As an illustration
of the notions which occupy the minds of courts because of these
circumstance, we may take the following passages from a recent
case in the Kentucky court:
"The' ownership of an easement extends only to such height
as reasonably to permit the full and free enjoyment thereof for
the purpose for which it was granted or acquired, and no further.
The easement holder would be as much a trespasser if he as-
cended and occupied the realm above the right of way for some
purpose not contemplated by the grant as would be a stranger
.... In other words, a right of way is a limited estate in land,
-limited as to dimension,-width, height, depth, and length,
and the grantee must keep within such limitations or he at once
becomes a trespasser .... He can protect from wrongful
invasion the whole of the right of way. Beyond this, he has no
legal concern."88
87
"Par consequent si ]a maison br.e ou si elle est d~nolie, le sol n'est
pas la proprit exclusive du propriftaire du rez-de-chanss~e; il appartient
indivis~ment A tous:' PLANioL, op. cit. ..pra note 75, § 2522, p. 781.
This defeasibility is not precluded by the many statements that the
right of the superficiary is 'perpetual." Demolombe, consistently enough,
remarks that the right is perpetual eceptZS soadcknvnt lea cIanue d'cztinc-
tfon du droit de proprit, en igard awe diff6rnts objets sur lesqueL il
-repose. The possibility of the property being the space apparently did not
occur to him.88 Per Sampson, J., in Citizens Telegraph Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0., and
T. P. R. R., 192 Ky. 399, 408, 233 S. W. 901, 903 (1921).
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Frequently a municipal corporation or public utility acquires,
,either by virtue of common law rights, or because of statutory
enlargements of powers of purchase or condemnation, what pur-
'ports to be more than a mere easement-a fee of some sort.
Sometimes this fee, by analogy to the common law easements,
is limited to the purposes for which an easement would have
sufficed, and is treated as defeasible and also limited in vertical
extent. Thus, a number of Acts of Parliament vesting in munic-
pal organizations the power to acquire the fee to streets have
been so construed. In the oft-cited case of Wandsworth Board of
Works v. United Telephone Co.,8) the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the defendants from maintaining a wire across a street. The
wire was strung from the roofs of the houses of the abutting
proprietors, and no poles or other surface appurtenances were set
in the street. The justices all recognized that the stringing of
a wire across one's land, although never in contact with the
physical corpus of the property traversed, would be grounds for
an action of trespass, yet they denied the plaintiff an injunction.
Brett, the Master of the Rolls, expressed his reasons, which met
with the concurrence of his colleagues, in the following words:
"I am of the opinion that this Act of Parliament by the use bf
the word 'street' does not pass any property above or over the
street, it only passes property in the street. It therefore passes
only that which is the ordinary space occupied by inen or things
which use the street as a street. Under these circumstances, it
appears to me that no property passed in that part of the air
through which, or in which, this telephone wire was placed." 10
It is implied by the decision that if the wires had been strung
through the area of user the board of works would have been
entitled to the injunction on the basis of trespass, but, because
the wires were strung above the area of usef, the board could
not be given relief. It looks as if the "street" were a; vertically
limited portion of space separately owned, not negativing the
ownership of the abutting proprietor above and below its area.9 '
89 13 Q. E. D. 904 (1884).
90 Ibid. 916. Accord: Finchley Electric Light Co. v. Finchley Urban Dis-
trict Council, [1903J 1 Ch. 437, 441, where Collins, M.R., said:
"The conclusion to be derived from the authorities seems to me to be
this: all the stratum of air above the surface and all the stratum of soil
below the surface which in any reasonable sense can be required for the
purposes of the street as a street vest in and beloiig to the local authority."
I No exact analogies in the decisions of the courts of last resort of the
United States are discoverable, at least with respect to the space above the
surface. Indeed, the more usual construction of the fee titles of municipal
corporations and public utilities leaves out vertical limitations, although
sometimes retaining defeasibility. Thus, in Town of Acldey v. Central
States Electric Co., 204 Iowa 1246, 214 N. W. 879 (1927), we find a dictum
to the effect that a municipal corporation may prevent the stringing of
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1
While this is a special rule, it demonstrates the possibility of
the separate ownership of distinct strata of the landspace.. The
more phases the conception takes, the more easily will it be fully
recognized .and applied if it can, when tested, accomplish useful
legal results.
VE
The indications are that our courts will soon be called upon
to test the utility of the conception. This skyscraper era affords
many possible situations to which it may apply. An illustration
will point the truth of this remark.
The attention of the laity as well as of the profession has
been recently called to a development squarely based upon the
belief of counsel that the land space above the surface of the soil
is divisible into strata. The application of this belief has been
made in transactions so spectacularly important that everyone
to whom the underlying theory and the achieving mechanism
has been explained has felt in consequence a stirring of the imag-
ination. What is now styled "the world's largest warehouse"
-an ephemeral title in this age of incessant construction-will
have neared completion or achieved it before this is read; but,
whether or not it will then retain its right to the grandiose
description now accorded it, it will still be the tangible symbol of
an endeavor as boldly conceived by the men of law who prepared
the way as by the architect who fathered its substantial existence.
It is the Merchandise Mart of Marshall Field and Company built
over the tracks of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad at
Wells, Kinzie, and Orleazis Street, and the Chicago river, in the
city of Chicago. Companion to it is the Chicago Daily News
building erected over land of the Chicago Union Station Com-
pany.
These transactions involve what have become known as a rail-
road's "air rights"-that is, rights to build in the space above
the trackage within the limits of the greater cities.02 A brief
study of the map of any large city shows the vast extent of
land surface needed and used by the railroads for their tracks
and terminals. This land surface is immensely valuable as real
-estate, as the carrying charges on it demonstrate; but what gives
-wires across the streets to which it has the fee no matter Vhat their
-height.
92The following recent articles are testimony to the current interest in
-tis matter: Bell, op. cit., supra note 46; Burritt, op. cit. mtpra note 49;
Becker, Subdividing the Air (1928) 7 TxTmn NEws 19; A Dccd to the
Air (editorial) (1929) 32 LAW NOTES 181. In addition, an article entitled
Air Rights Swallows Railways (1928) 50 Pop. MECuAmucs 227, refers
'briefly to the legal problems while discussing chiefly the engineering prob-
lems in connection with the Daiy News venture.
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value to city business property is of course the ability to erect
multi-storied buildings bringing in large rentals. Railroading,
however, must be done on the surface. The dilemma is that the
railroads must require the surface area, and yet pay carrying
charges upon the potential earnings of the cubic space many feet
up which can never be used for railroading.
The railroads have not been blind to the unfortunate aspects
of their position. In this country several attempts have been
made to utilize the space over the tracks in cities. The Grand
Central terminal or Park Avenue development in New York City
is a good example. In that case, however, the land covered by
the tracks was not owned by the railroads, but by a terminal
company which has leased building rights for terms of twenty-
one years with two options of renewal. The title was thus re-
tained by the terminal company, and, if the trackage rights
were excepted from the subject-matter demised, the result was
nothing more than a lease of all the land with easements
reserved 3
Several difficulties confront railroad companies in the develop-
ment of the space over their lines. In the first place, being
corporations with limited powers only, they cannot ordinarily
engage in the real estate business on a wide scale."4 They can-
not build long blocks of skyscrapers and lease them; similarly,
they cannot make wholesale leases of the space to others who
might themselves build. Then, too, railroad financing is almost
without exception founded upon general mortgages or trust
deeds underlying bond issues, covering of course the real estate
of which the rights of way are a part. Any structure as per-
manent as a twenty-story building would become subject to the
liens of the mortgages or trust deeds. Building leases to others
are prevented.
It is because of these and similar considerations that the rail-
roads have been experimenting with the conception of separately
owned strata of space. In all of the general incumbrances of
railroad property there can doubtless be found provisions for
the release of the portions not needed for railroad operations.
These provisions of course vary. Whatever the variance, they
permit the release for conveyance to others of unnecessary or
superfluous land. It has therefore occurred to counsel for some
of these companies to take advantage of these provisions by
conveying space above the tracks free from the general i'cum-
903 Burritt, op. cit. supra note 49, at 39.9 The trouble which the Pullman Company had on the erection of its
building in Chicago is an illustration of the limitation the doctrine of ultra
vires places on the powers of railroads. Reference is made in note 100
infra to difficulties of this sort which apparently still confront British
railways.
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brances. The two transactions already mentioned have been
undertaken on this basis. The transaction between the Chicago
Daily News and the Chicago Union Station Company cannot be
described more tersely than in the language of one who, as coun-
sel for the News, was himself in large measure responsible for
the solution of the difficulties:
"The Union Station deeded to the Daily News the entire in-
terest in the property in question, excepting therefrom the space
below a designated plane, and exceptig from the exception the
right to run columns and foundations through the excepted space.
The railroad thus expressly disposes of all the property except
thia.t below the specified plane, which excepted property includes
the tracks and right of way that cannot be got out from under
the mortgage." 0
This transaction truly represents what the same writer later
calls it--"a conveyance of the air lot with a right to support." 11
The other transaction mentioned, that between the Chicago
and Northwestern Railroad and Marshall Field and Company,
is, if anything, even more of a pioneer in this field. Here, instead
of positive easements of support, the grantee desired to have
the title to the space tb be occupied by the caissons upon which
the proposed building was to rest and by the steel supporting
columns extending from the caissons to a point above the space
reserved for the railroad, as well as to have the title to the space.
above that. To make possible a conveyance accomplishing this,
the land was resubdivided, and a plat recorded.r Instead of
the usual sort of a plat, this one indicated what was intended
to be an identification of lots, not by surface markings, but by
three-dimensional descriptions.
95 Bell, op. cit. supra note 46, at 261.
00 Mr. 33ell tells us that his conveyance is similar to those made by the
Pennsylvania Railroad in New York and by the Reading Railroad in
Philadelphia. IbMd. 264.
No question of ultra vires or similar objection can be urged in Illinois to
such a conveyance by any Illinois railroad, union depot, or terminal com-
pany to which a recent flinois statute is applicable. ILL. REV. STATUTES
(1929) c. 114, § 174a provides that, where lands owned in fee, or different
levels of them, can be devoted to other than railroad uses "without un-
reasonable impairment of the remainder for railroad purposes," the com-
pany "may improve, utilize, and develop the parb of such real estate sus-
ceptible of such other use or uses," and "may subdivide the separate level
or levels susceptible of suc] other uses into lots and blocks,... and may
sell, convey, and transfer to purchasers any separable parmt or parts (singly
or combined) of such real estate at, above, or below the natural surface
of the ground ... or may lease to others." Provision is made for the
approval of all such developments, conveyances, and leases by the Illinois
Commerce Commission. This is a statutory recognition of the possibility
of vertical division of land space.
137Power so to subdivide is specifically granted in the statute just quoted.
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The architect had already drafted his plans for the proposed
buildipg. To provide for the caissons called for in his plans,
the plat and its accompanying data identify some six hundred
caisson lots. They are described as:
"All the land, property, and space at and below horizontal
plane zero Chicago City Datum in six hundred complete cylinders
formed by projecting vertically downward from said plane the
circles forming the boundaries of said lots as represented on
the plat." Il
Zero Datum is about five feet below the surface of the soil
at this point. Above each caisson lot is a rectangular prism
extending to a point about eighteen feet above the surface, or,
more accurately, twenty-three feet above zero Chicago City
Datum. They are described as:
"All the land, property, and space in six hundred quadrangular
prisms of the horizontal dimensions shown on the plat, extend-
ing vertically between horizontal planes respectively at zero and
tventy-three feet above Chicago City Datum."
Then there is what is designated on both plat and deed as the
"air-lot"-a bit of space described as:.
"All the land, property, and space at and above a horizontal
plane tventy-three feet above Chicago City Datum bounded on
the East by Wells St., on the North by Kinzie St., on the West
by the Franklin-Orleans Viaduct, and on the South by the Chi-
cago River."
The caisson lots, prism lots, and the air-lot so identified have
all been granted in fee to Marshall Field and Company. The
railroad, by necessary implication, retains the title to the re-
mainder of the original plot of ground. No easements of support
are necessary, nor are any granted2 9
The boldness of conception from which resulted this three-
dimensional subdivision of the land space has an appeal both
to the layman and to the lawyer. Whether it is more or less.
practical than the Daily News conveyance remains an open
question. Time may prove that it is too inflexible for the pur-
pose for which it was devised. Such criticism as the plan may
08 These descriptions are quoted by Becker, op. cit. supra note 92, at 20.
Mr. Becker, who is vice-president of the Chicago Title & Trust Co., was
himself one of the authors of the plat.
09 The importance of the undertaking is realized when we are reminded
that the cost of the Merchandise Mart is estimated at $30,000,000, and that
it is to have, when completed, a total floor space of 4,000,000 square feet,
twice the size of the Furniture Mart in Chicago. See Burritt, op. cit. supra
note 49.
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a bold precedent which will undoubtedly have its influence on the
professional attitude toward the nature of land and the possi-
prove to deserve cannot detract from the fact that it serves as
bility of its vertical division. 00
100 Oddly enough, certain earlier English cases dealing with analogous
problems of railroad corporations have been unmentioned in all the dis-
cussions over these dealings -with "air rights."
In Mulliner v. Midland Ry. Co., 11 Ch. D. 611 (1879), the railway bad
sold to the plaintiff tracts on either side of the right of way together
with a way between the tracts which led through an arch beneath
the railway station and which was elevated. The land and way were sold
as superfluous land within the meaning of the Land Clauses Act, defining
them as " . . lands acquired by the promoters of the undertaklin under
the provisions of this or the special Act... but which shall not) be re-
quired for the purposes thereof." The question. whether the way through
the arch was superfluous land arose when the railway sought to close the
arch. The court answered in the negative, and upheld the right of the
railway to close the arch. Sessel, MT.R., reasoned as follows.
"The whole thing, the land below the arches, and the pavement, works,
and passenger station above the arches-all form the railway station, and
is, according to the definition, part of the 'railway and works.' Now for
what purpose is that to be used? It is to be used for the purposes of the
Act, that is, for the general purposes of a railway. ... It would be a
very odd thing, even if there were no enactment to the contrary, to allow
a corporation formed to hold land for a special. purpose, and to take that
land compulsorily from the owners only for that purpose, to devote the
land to another purpose, or to alienate the land generally under any notion
of the rights of an ordinary proprietor." Ibid. 619.
The Master of the Rolls added that the railway company did mot have
the ordinary rights of proprietors, but held the lands to use "merely for
the special purposes" of iLt creating act. He pointed out that the 'qand"
under the arch was required for support. "It is quite plain," he concluded,
"that the land cannot be treated as land- not required for the purposes of
the railway.' Tbha 621.
The next year the case of In re Metropolitan Dist By. and Cosh, 13 Ch.
D. 607 (1880), was decided. The railway had been run underground, and
sought to convey the land above thq tunnel as superfluous land. The con-
veyance was attacked. In the court below, Fry, J., pointed out that the
railway, in condemning the land, had to take it in its full vertical extent,
but concluded:
"However convenient it may be for the company to sell, or to grant
building rights over, and building leases of, the crown or roof of their
tunnel, they have no title to do so under the statutory powers with 'which
they are invested." Thu. 612.
The decision below -was upheld on appeal. The Mulliner case, supr,
was cited, and new reasons were advanced. Jessel, M.B., suggested that the
requirement that the railway dispose of its superfluous lands within a
specified period argued against the right of the railway to divide its land
by a horizontal plane:
"It would be an extraordinary thing if a railway company -were to be
compellable to decide as to the necessity of retaining the horizontal strata
of every piece of land . . . from the beginning to the end of their line."
Ib&i. 61T.
Some of Jessel's language indicates that he would have had difficulty
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Both arrangements, despite their differences in the matter of
support, are unqualified recognitions both of the ownership of
space, and of its vertical division. As such, they demonstrate
why the present inquiry is not a purely academic one, but rather
is anticipatory of problems which must some day in the not
greatly distant future be settled by the courts. They emphasize
the tremendous value of rights to. the possession of the space
over land, and they suggest a few reasons why man may find it
profitable to make divisions of it in strata. That other reasons
in other situations may and will compel similar arrangements
cannot be doubted. The influence of economic conditions on
in recognizing such a division even when made by an ordinary proprietor,
but the decision is particularly based on the statutory powers of the
railroads.
There are, however, other intimations in these cases which are seized
upon and enlarged in later decisions arguing for the right of an ordinary
proprietor to make such divisions. Thus Baggallay, L.S., doubted the
decision of his colleagues in the Cosh case, supra, saying:
"Now if, after the railway has been completed, the mass of earth above
the tunnel, b6ing such that any subsequent repairs must of necessity be
done from the inside and not from the outside, I should, as at present
advised be disposed to hold that the company might make a severance by
a horizontal division of the land. so acquired, retaining all below the rail-
way and a certain portion above the railway within limits to be regulated
by the nature of the case." 13 Ch. D. at 623.
In Rosenberg v. Cook, 8 Q. B. D. 162 (1881), the nature of what passed
by a similar ultra vires conveyance was stated to be more than a revoc-
able easement or license; it was a bare possession, good against all the
world except the railway company, and analogous to the right of a dis-
seisor or trespasser.
In Midland Ry. v. Wright, [1901] 1 Ch. D. 738, a disseisor of the sur-
face over a railway tunnel was held to have acquired a title by adverse
possession. Byrne, J., said:
"I consider that the defendant and his predecessors in title have ac-
quired by possession title to the surface of the land, with so much of
what is beneath as is necessary for the enjoyment of it, subject to the
right of the plaintiffs to the tunnel and to so much of the underlying and
superincumbent strata as is necessary for its due and proper enjoyment
as and for a tunnel." Ibid. 744.
Reliance for this decision was placed upon Rosenberg v. Cook, eupra,
and the implication of these cases is that the Mulliner and Cosh decisions,
both supra, must be ascribed solely to the inability of railways, with their
limited statutdry powers, to convey such horizontal strata, and not to any
inherent inability of the average fee owner to make such divisions. In
fact, the clear implication is that such owners can make conveyances of
horizontal strata.
The rule crystallized by the Cosh case has been strictly followed both
in England and Scotland (where the English acts apply), so that, unless
changes have been made in their statutory powers, British railways can-
not develop thfeir "air rights" in the manner of the two. Chicago trans-
actions. See Re Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. and Earl of Derby's Contract,
100 L. T. 44 (1908); Glasgow 4 S. W. Ry. v. Caledonian Ry., 19 Scot. L. R.
547 (1882).
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legal institutions is not questioned in current legal philosophy.
Here is a place where practical economics will exert an influence;
here are the germs of revolutionary conceptions."",
We have seen that there have been endeavors to convey as
separate holdings portions of space lying above the surface, de-
fined by horizontal as well as by vertical planes, and not identi-
fied by solid matter occupying them. No reason has been found
in the cases why such conveyances cannot be made. No estab-
lished policy of the law appears to stand in their way.02 The
cases offer few precedents, but those which seem to ignore the
ownership of space and pay attention only to the matter occupy-
ing space do not negate the possibility of conveying stratified
space by proper words. The facts of the particular cases, the
improbability of any intention of the parties under the circum-
stances to stratify the land, and the lack of any urgent reason
why such a construction should have been given-these are ex-
planations which readily occur. That the courts have relied on
such explanations is an argument for the recognition of the legal
soundness of such transactions as prepared the way for the
Marshall Field and Daily News buildings. Then, too, the cases
give some encouragement. Results sometimes reached, more
frequently the language used, show that our courts will not be
unwilling to give such recognition when called upon to do so.
'D' Burritt remarks: qf we are to believe the principal architects and
builders of the country, the upward ascent has only begun... Real estate
is no longer a groundlevel consideration. Its chief value in many sec-
tions of our cities is--or presently will be-from the ground up." Bur-
ritt, loc. cit. supra note 49.
The newspapers within the last couple of years carried an estimate of
Charles Markham, chairman of the board of the Illinois Central Railroad,
that the air rights over the company's traclm in Grant Park, Chicago, were
worth $100,000,000. No one has questioned the conservativeness of the
estimate.
Another suggested use of the air rights over railroads has been made
within the year by a committee of the city council of Chicago, headed by
Alderman Massen, which has advocated building super-highways over the
railroad trackage.
o 0 Professor Kocourek believes that considerations of convenience should
argue against recognition of such strata ownership. The solution of our
problem, he suggests, should be "one of policy and nob one of logic." The
State is interested in having land divisions on a basis "which does not
present too much difficulty in identifying the thing elements which are
to be taxed." He suggests that the "legal difficulties of adjusting the
legal relations of each owner to each of the others" where several strata
are separately owned "would be insuperably complex and would work
against economic utility." He conbludes that "the doctrine is highly in-
convenient in any case, and the results sought could better be attained by
refusing to recognize ownership of land as horizontally divisible and by
treating such departures as jure in re alicnac." KocOursK, 3uRAL
RELATIoNs (1927) 338-339.
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While the decision of the courts upon matters still more or less
academik can never be predicted with any assumption of cer-
tainty, we are still entitled to believe that some day the stratifi-
cation of ]andspace will be commonly accepted. Indeed, the
trend of economic development, so often the presage of the legal
future, leads to some degree of confidence in this belief.
